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"[S]ay what you mean," the March Hare went on.
"I do," Alice hastily replied; "at least-at least I mean what I say-
that's the same thing, you know."
"Not the same thing a bit!" said the Hatter. "Why, you might just as
well say that 'I see what I eat' is the same thing as 'I eat what I see'!"
Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 73 (Grosset & Dun-
lap Publishing 1996) (1946).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, via the initiative and referendum process,' Californians were
presented with Proposition 187, the stated purpose of which was to prevent
"illegal aliens" in the United States from receiving the benefits of public
services in the State of California.2 It was passed by the voters of California
on November 8, 1994, in the general election by a margin of fifty-nine
percent to forty-one percent, and became effective the following day. As a
result of a number of actions filed challenging the initiative, many of its
provisions became the subject of a preliminary injunction.3
Nicknamed "SOS" for "save our state," Proposition 187 raised the ugly
specter of xenophobia and racism at a time when Californians, like the
residents of many states, were faced with budget shortfalls, reductions in
essential services, and record unemployment. In this context, the "illegal"-
4
1. The California Constitution provides for a process called initiative and referendum, whereby voters
can propose laws, statutes and amendments, and enact them at the polls:
The legislative power of this State shall be vested in a Senate and Assembly which shall be
designated "The Legislature of the State of California," but the people reserve to themselves the
power to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution, and to adopt or reject same, at the
polls independent of the Legislature, and also reserve the power, at their own option, to so adopt or
reject any act, or section or part of any act, passed by the Legislature.
The first power reserved to the people shall be known as the initiative .... The second power
reserved to the people shall be known as the referendum.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
For a thorough treatment of the initiative and referendum process, see Robin Charlow, Judicial Review,
Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527 (1994); Julian N. Eule,
Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990); and Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The
Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. I, 13-15 (1978). As Bell notes,
"direct democracy, carried out in the privacy of the voting booth, has diminished the ability of minority
groups to participate in the democratic process. Ironically, because it enables the voters' racial beliefs and
fears to be recorded and tabulated in their pure form, the referendum has been a most effective facilitator
of that bias, discrimination, and prejudice which has marred American democracy from its earliest day."
2. The Findings and Declarations portion of Proposition 187 provided as follows:
The People of California find and declare as follows:
That they have suffered and are suffering personal injury and damage caused by the criminal
conduct of illegal aliens in this state.
That they have a right to the protection of their government from any person or persons entering
this country unlawfully.
Therefore, the People of California declare their intention to provide for cooperation between
their agencies of state and local government with the federal government, and to establish a system
of required notification by and between such agencies to prevent illegal aliens in the United States
from receiving benefits or public services in the State of California.
3. On December 14, 1994, the United States District Court, Central District of California, granted
plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunction prohibiting operation and enforcement of provisions 4, 5, 6,
7, and 9 of Proposition 187, and further prohibiting promulgation or dissemination of any regulations
concerning these provisions. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 764
(C.D. Cal. 1995).
4. Those persons who are neither permanent residents nor holders of valid visas, nor persons
otherwise authorized to be present in the United States are often referred to as "illegal" aliens. Aside from
being highly inflammatory, this term is also highly imprecise, as it covers under its vast pejorative
penumbra a host of persons, from students or visitors who entered the country while properly documented
whose visas later lapsed, to persons who may have committed crimes abroad and then entered the country
surreptitiously without documentation.
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alien seemed a convenient scapegoat to account for the financial ills of
California.5 This is particularly true as it has become fashionable for states to
attempt to turn back the cost of providing services to illegal aliens to the
6federal government.
Two questions are posed here regarding Proposition 187: What does it say?
What does it mean? This Article seeks to provide answers as to what the
statute says by examining its actual text, and also to discuss the constitutional
concerns raised by the statute. One such constitutional concern is the
Supremacy Clause, as it is not clear that the state of California may legislate
in the area of immigration. In fact, the issue of preemption is at the crux of a
recent federal district court decision regarding Proposition 187.7 Another
area of concern is the Fourteenth Amendment, given the initiative's concern
with aliens.8 Proposition 187, therefore, has the dubious distinction of
potentially offending the Constitution on numerous bases.
Although preemption may provide a handy device for analysis, it is
possible that proposed and recently enacted changes in federal law may make
further discussion of constitutional issues more necessary to the analysis.9
For purposes of analysis in this Article, no other California state constitu-
tional provisions will be discussed. It is noteworthy, however, that there
might be interpretations of various constitutional provisions under California
constitutional law which might differ somewhat from federal provisions. This is so
because of California's declaration of independent constitutional rights.to
5. See Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens,
and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1139, 1162-63 (1993) (citing GORDON W.
ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDiCE 236-38 (abr. ed. 1958)). See also Peter H. Schuck, The Transforma-
tion of Immigration Law, 84 COLLYM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984). Schuck writes, "[at the psychological and
emotional levels, immigration generates complex public attitudes toward outsiders and newcomers.
Especially during periods of economic distress, a recurrent nativism has tapped the dark wellsprings of
racial and religious bigotry in America, releasing forces that have profoundly shaped the character of
immigration and national politics." id.
6. Recent examples are the efforts by high immigration states such as California, Texas, Florida,
Arizona, New Jersey and New York to recover from the federal government the cost of providing for
undocumented persons. Thus far, the states have been unsuccessful in the lower federal courts, and at least
one state, Florida, is appealing to the Supreme Court. See New York is Blocked in Bid to Get U.S. to Pay for
Immigrants, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1996, at B4.
7. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
8. Aliens are "persons" under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, and are guaranteed due
process of law by the Fifth Amendment. This is equally true for aliens who are here illegally. Shaughnessy
v- United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U-S. 206, 212 (1953); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S, 228, 238
(1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-69 (1886). The Supreme Court has also held that the Fifth
Amendment protects aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful from invidious discrimination by
the federal government. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77-79 (1976). As Gerald L. Neuman remarks in
Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection
Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1425, 1426 (1995), while alienage discrimination at the state level is subject
to strict scrutiny, discrimination by Congress merits only rational basis review.
9. For example, the "Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996"
which was signed into law on August 22, 1996, dramatically altered alien access to federal means-tested
programs- Popularly referred to as the "Welfare Reform Bill," the Act narrows the categories of eligible
aliens. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
10. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24. See also Rachel A. Van Cleave, A Constitution in Conflict: The Doctrine
of Independent State Grounds and the Voter Initiative in California, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 95, 96-98
(1993). Van Cleave discusses the use of the initiative in California to effectively change the state's
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One aspect of the meaning of the initiative which is not discussed in detail
in this Article, but which looms over any analysis of Proposition 187, is the
initiative's social impact. As Gerald Neuman observes in his discussion of
immigration in the first century of this country's history, "the legal invalidity
of state restrictions would be unimportant so long as the restrictions were
actually enforced, or potential immigrants were deterred by the belief that
they would be enforced." 1 The greatest impact that Proposition 187 may
have is just that: with or without injunctions preventing enforcement of
certain provisions of the statute, and despite how courts may decide as to the
ultimate constitutional validity of many of its provisions, some aliens have
already been, and may continue to be, hindered by wrongful attempts at
enforcement, or by fear of enforcement. ' 2 Thus, in addition to legal or textual
analysis of the statute, we must also concern ourselves with the fact that such
provisions can even be seriously proposed as law, given the potential harmful
impact, and given the ill will they engender, which may be long in dissi-
pating.
The adoption of Proposition 187 is a dramatic illustration of the widely
held image of the alien as "Other," as the stranger among us.' 3 Drafters and
proponents of Proposition 187 are using it for more than its monetary
economies. They are using it as a weapon in a deliberate attempt to force a
confrontation between anti-immigrant and pro-immigrant forces. 4 Viewed
in this light, Proposition 187 becomes a part of a larger philosophical and
constitution by limiting the doctrine of independent state grounds. Californians may still look to
independent state grounds in the analysis of constitutional rights such as a tight to privacy and to freedom
of expression, as well as the right to a public education, a right not guaranteed under the federal
constitution.
11. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century oflmmigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1833,
1837 n.20 (1993).
12. For example, several news sources reported that two girls in the Los Angeles area said that they
were denied a pizza after the clerk at the shop asked for their green cards. See, e.g., Peter Hecht, A
"Freedom Summer"-1990s Style, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 30, 1995, at Al. Although it was not clear
whether or not the story was apocryphal, there were instances in which undocumented persons failed to
seek services. A number of persons feared seeking medical treatment according to affidavits filed in
League of United Latin American Citizens, 908 F. Supp. 755.
13. See, e.g., KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 2 (1989) (citing Simone de Beauvoir's use
of the term "Other" to connote a sense of not belonging (THE SECOND SEX xix-xx (Random House ed.
1993) (1949))). In The Second Sex, de Beauvoir develops the notion of the Other in her discussion of
women vis a vis men. She states:
He is the Subject, he is the Absolute-she is the Other.
The category of the Other is as primordial as consciousness itself. In most primitive societies, in
most ancient mythologies, one finds the expression of a duality-that of the Self and the Other.
In small-town eyes all persons not belonging to the village are "strangers" and suspect; to the
native of a country all who inhabit other countries are "foreigners"; Jews are "different" for the
anti-Semite, Negroes are "inferior" for American racists, aborigines are "natives" for colonists,
proletarians are the "lower class" for the privileged.
Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex xl-xli (Random House ed. 1993) (1949).
14. Johnson, supra note 5, at 1167. Johnson suggests that part of the animus is clearly racial, and
Johnson here cites to a Los Angeles Times article, wherein Republican presidential candidate Patrick
Buchanan states: "If we had to take a million immigrants in say, Zulus, next year, or Englishmen, and put
them up in Virginia, what group would be easier to assimilate and would cause less trouble for the people
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political battle. However, both proponents and opponents of the initiative
should be wary of fighting a war outside of the words of the statute. If there is
to be a battle, it should be fought, or at least initiated, on the four comers of
the document.
II. WHAT DOES IT SAY?-PROVISIONS OF PROPOSITION 187
Proposition 187 denies public education, non-emergency health care and
public social services to those who are not legally in this country. It requires
providers of services, such as health care facilities, educators, social workers
and law enforcement officers, to verify the immigration status of individuals
and to report suspected undocumented aliens to the United States Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS) and other authorities. ' 5
Educators at the primary and secondary school level will be required to
verify the citizenship, residency or immigration status of all students, and of
the students' parents. Upon either an actual detennination or suspicion that a
student or his parents are not lawfully present in this country, educators will
be required to notify the parents that school services will be terminated after
ninety days if lawful presence cannot be proven.16 These provisions on
education limit access to public colleges and universities as well.' 7 Further,
Proposition 187 makes it a crime to produce fraudulent documentation
regarding immigration status, or to use such documents to conceal one's
citizenship or resident alien status.'
8
A. Findings and Declaration
The preamble to Proposition 187 is particularly provocative. In the
Findings and Declarations section, as it is termed, the drafters state that the
people of California "have suffered and are suffering personal injury and
damage caused by the criminal conduct of illegal aliens" in California.19 This
section goes on to state that the people of California "have a right to the
protection of their government from any person or persons entering this
country unlawfully." 
20
B. Penal Code Amendments
The provisions of Proposition 187 that amend the California Penal Code
address the manufacture and distribution of "false documents" as well as the
of Virginia?" Id. (citing Douglas Jehl, Buchanan Raises Specter oflntolerance, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1992,
at A1).
15. See Appendix.
16. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215 (West 1995).
17. CAL EDUC. CODE § 66010.8 (West 1995).
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use of such documents. 21 The first clause states that "any person who
manufactures, distributes, or sells false documents to conceal the true
citizenship or resident alien status of another person is guilty of a felony,"
and imposes a seventy-five thousand dollar fine and a five-year prison
sentence. 2
Another amendment to the penal code is a provision which calls for the
cooperation of law enforcement agencies in California with the INS if any
person arrested is suspected of being in violation of federal immigration
laws.23 The first portion of the amendment details procedures which local law
enforcement agents shall follow regarding a person who is arrested and
suspected of being present in the Unites States in violation of immigration
laws. These procedures include determining if the person is either a lawful
permanent resident, a temporary resident, or a person who is present in'
violation of the laws. 24 The second portion then describes the scope of the
verification process, and indicates that such verification may include ques-
tions regarding the individual's date or place of birth, date of entry into the
United States, and demands for documentation indicating legal status.25 The
section further requires law enforcement officials to "notify" the individual
of his or her apparent status as an illegal alien, and to "notify" the individual
that, apart from criminal justice proceedings, he or she must obtain legal
status or leave.26 The final two portions of this section require that the
Attorney General of California be notified of the alien's apparent illegal
status and provided any additional information requested; and also prohibit
the drafting of any laws preventing or limiting the enforcement of the
regulations.
C. Public Social Services
The provisions of Proposition 187 which amend the California Welfare
and Institution Code,2 " affecting the rights of aliens to public social services,
begins with a statement of purpose which purports to carry out the intentions
of the people of California that no one but citizens of the United States and
lawful permanent residents may receive public social service benefits. The
statement of purpose further indicates that the intent of such amendments is
to ensure that all persons employed in the providing of such services shall
"diligently protect" such funds from misuse. The section also indicates that
services 'Tray also be provided to persons lawfully admitted for a temporary
period of time.
21. CAL. PENAL CODE § 113 (West 1995).
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 114 (West 1995).
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834b(a) (West 1995).
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834b (b)(1) (West 1995).
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834b (b)(1) (West 1995).
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834b (b)(2) (West 1995).
27. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 834b (b)(3) & (c) (West 1995).
28. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5 (West 1995).
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Going beyond the statement of purpose, the section sets forth steps which
must be taken by any public entity which determines or reasonably suspects
that a person who has applied for public social services is an alien in the
United States in violation of federal law. Such an entity is required first to
deny the benefits requested, and then to notify the applicant in writing of his
or her apparent illegal status and that the person must either obtain legal
status or leave the United States. The entity must also notify the State
Director of Social Services, the Attorney General of California, and the INS
of the apparent illegal status of the applicant for benefits, and must cooperate
in providing other information requested by these agencies.
D. Publicly-Funded Health Care Services
The section of Proposition 187 which amends the California Health and
Services Code concerning publicly funded health care services begins with a
statement of purpose virtually identical to that in the public social services
section. 2 ' This section limits receipt of non-emergency medical care to
citizens and lawfully admitted permanent or temporary residents. The provi-
sions requiring health care facilities to deny services to persons determined
or reasonably suspected to be present in the country in violation of federal
law are potentially offensive on due process grounds. The section on
notification to aliens of their apparent illegal status and notification of other
agencies by public medical service providers also mirrors the sections
concerning public social services.
E. Provisions on Education
Proposition 187 amends the California Education Code to prevent any
public elementary or secondary school from admitting or allowing "the
attendance of any child who is not a citizen of the United States, an alien
lawfully admitted as a permanent resident, or a person who is otherwise
authorized under federal law to be in the United States."-
30
This section then goes on to require that information regarding the status
of both children and their parents shall be provided to the State Superinten-
dent for Public Instruction, the Attorney General of California, and the INS,
as well as to the parents of the children. The "notices" provided to the
parents of the children either determined to be illegally present or suspected
to be illegally present are required to state that an existing pupil may not
continue to attend school after ninety calendar days from the date of the
notice, unless legal status is established. The section on education also
contains provisions regarding public post-secondary education that will
forbid the admission, enrollment, or attendance of persons determined not to
29. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130 (West 1995).
30. CAL. Eouc. CODE § 48215 (West 1995).
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be either citizens, lawfully admitted permanent residents, or otherwise
authorized to be present under federal law.
3
'
F. Attorney General Cooperation
This section mandates that the reports transmitted by local government
entities to the Attorney General of the State of California pursuant to other
sections of Proposition 187 also be transmitted to the INS.3 2 This section
further requires that the state Attorney General maintain "on-going and
accurate records of such reports," and that the office provide any other
information requested by any other governmental entity.3 3
G. Amendment and Severability
This concluding section details the extent to which provisions in Proposi-
tion 187 may be amended, and contains a severability clause protecting the
balance of the provisions in the event that any are found invalid.3 4 Amend-
ment may occur only upon roll call vote entered in the journal in which
two-thirds of the membership concurs, or by a statute approved by the voters.
III. WHAT DOES IT MEAN?-PROPOSITION 187 AND THE CONSTITUTION:
THE FEDERAL POWER TO REGULATE IMMIGRATION VERSUS STATE POWER
In analyzing the constitutionality of Proposition 187, it is necessary to turn
to basic issues: governmental organization and the exercise of power versus
the protection of the freedoms of citizens (and non-citizens) by constitutional
provisions.3 5 Does the government have the power to act regarding immigra-
tion? Looking to the federal government, this question can be answered in the
affirmative. Although the U.S. Constitution does not speak directly to the
issue of immigration, Article One could be said to give the federal govern-




35. Judge Jerre S. Williams, in his book CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS provides a basic method for
constitutional analysis. Judge Williams writes:
It is not analytically sound to consider the organization of the federal government and its
relationship to state governments before considering the constitutional aspects of individual liberty
because constitutional questions concerning the protection of individual liberty arise in all
constitutional cases, including those allocating governmental power to the national government or
the state governments.
JERRE S. WILLIAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 35 (1979).
This concept however presents a dilemma in the consideration of federal immigration law and the
constitutional rights of aliens. As Hiroshi Motomura describes in The Curious Evolution ofIrmigration
Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992), this is
a mainstream approach which does not describe immigration law at the federal level. Because of the long
dependence upon the plenary power doctrine, under which the executive branch and Congress have far
reaching authority in immigration matters, the individual liberty interests of aliens in immigration matters
were often not considered worthy of discussion.
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ment certain power over it. In the area of immigration law, it has become
clear that the federal government, with a few limited exceptions, holds
supreme power.36 Most significantly, Congress has the authority to devise a
uniform rule of naturalization.37 In addition, the Migration Clause38 and the
War Clause 39 provide potential bases for Congressional power over immigra-
tion.
In early cases it was the Commerce Clause, however, which was most
often cited as the basis of express constitutional power giving Congress
authority in the area of immigration. This authority flowed from Congress'
authority to regulate commerce across national borders. 40 The perceived
source of Congress' right to make rules regarding immigration has shifted
from its basis on the Commerce Clause to the view that control over national
borders is one of the inherent rights of sovereignty. 4 1 The federal power over
immigration is plenary; that is, it is based on the notion of an implied federal
immigration power which is "inherent in the very notion of a sovereign
State."' 42 The plenary power doctrine, as it is known, has come to be the basis
for immigration decisions by the federal government involving the entry and
presence of aliens in the country.43 This is true even where those decisions
may appear to reduce or limit the constitutional rights of aliens relative to
citizens. 44
The general view concerning cases involving state regulation of immigra-
tion has been that they demonstrate a gradual diminution in the authority of
the states in the area of immigration. It has even been argued that a state's
acts on issues concerning aliens and their entrance into the country is not
"immigration law" at all, and that such law did not exist until 1875 when the
first federal immigration statute was enacted. 5 It is misleading, however, to
conclude that the history of immigration in the United States is a history
36. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
38. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 1 provides: "The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year
one thousand eight hundred and eight .... It is not clear that this power is completely relevant to
immigration however. In the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283 (1849), the justices disagreed as to whether
this clause applied only to the migration of slaves, or whether it could be applied to immigrants as well.
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1I. Again, as in the case of the Migration or Importation clauses, the
Justices in the Passenger Cases also disagreed as to whether this clause covered the regulation of aliens
who were not nationals of countries against whom the United States had declared war. See 48 U.S. 283.
40. See Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283; Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
41. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206 (1953).
42. STEPHEN H. LEOOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 17 (1992).
43. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 14-15
(1985).
44. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,80 (1970).
45. Motomura, supra note 35, at 1626. Professor Motomura argues that there are two categories of
immigration law, subconstitutional immigration law, or "true" immigration law, which he defines as the
interpretation and application of statutes, regulations, or administrative guidelines, and constitutional
immigration law, which he defines as the application of constitutional norms and principles to test the
validity of immigration rules in subconstitutional form. The actions of Congress and executive agencies
since 1875 have been for the most part of the subeonstitutional variety. id.
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starting with and limited to the development of federal legislation. A look at
the history of cases involving state immigration reveals a clear cut body of
law permitting to the states certain well-defined acts regarding immigration
as it applies to actual entry of aliens into the country, and gradually defining
the theories under which a state might act.
The fact is that the earliest examples of federal immigration policy adopted
were to a great degree the same types of prohibitions which had been seen at
the state level. In 1875 and in 1882, federal statutes were enacted barring the
admission of criminals, prostitutes, idiots, lunatics, and persons likely to
become a public charge. 46 These provisions merely echoed state pronounce-
ments. Neither of these acts was subjected to judicial scrutiny,4 7 which could
have been a good measure of their validity because the types of areas
regulated had long been seen as state responsibilities. Part of the 1882
legislation involved assessment charges for the entry of aliens, much like
those assessed on the state level.4 8 Although it had been conceived of at the
state level, the collection of a tax assessed per entering aliens, or "head
money," was permitted at the federal level.4 9
In many of the early cases where the states acted in the area of immigra-
tion, their actions came into conflict with federal schemes. In Gibbons v.
Ogden,50 the Supreme Court invalidated a monopoly over New York steam
boat regulations. In that case, for the first time, the carriage of passengers was
included in the meaning of commerce. However, it was noted in Gibbons v.
Ogden that some actions which might be regulated by Congress under the
46. ActofMarch 3, 1875, Ch- 141, 18 Stat. 477;ActofAugust 3, 1882, Ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214.
It is interesting to note, in comparing the language of the federal statute with the typical language of
state statutes on the same subject, that vague and generalized concerns about the entry of unaccompanied
and widowed women in early state statutes, language which pointedly referred to potential indigents who
could not give good accounts of "himself or herself' were seemingly transformed at the federal level into
a prohibition against "prostitutes." The 1875 act cited above was in fact commonly referred to as the Alien
Prostitution Importation Act, and explicitly forbade the importation of women into the United States for
purposes of prostitution.
Such a view of single alien women as being potentially given to vice is seen implicitly in the court's
opinion in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), a case in which a Japanese woman who
came into the United States for the purposes of meeting her husband, a Japanese man who had sent for her,
was denied admission into the United States. The court made much of the fact that the woman did not
know where her husband lived, therefore questioning either the existence of the marriage or the woman's
veracity. The woman in Nishimura Ekiu was in fact excluded under the 1882 Act referred to above, as a
person who had no apparent means of support and was therefore likely to become a public charge.
However, according to Frank F Chuman, she was a 25-year-old who had been married for two years to a
man who had been in the United States for one year. She was not unlike a "picture bride," a Japanese
woman secured for marriage to a Japanese national living in the United states through the exchange of
photographs. THE BAMBOO PEOPLE 12-13 (1976). For a further discussion of the importation of women to
the United States for marriage see Note, Mail Order Brides: Gilded Prostitution and the Legal Response,
28 U. MIcH-. J.L. REF. 197, 200 (1994). This note also discusses the explicit exclusion of Chinese
prostitutes and later Chinese women in general.
47. Although the case of Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. 651, explored certain aspects of the Immigration
Act of 1882 prohibiting the entry of persons who were subject to become a public charges, this was notper
se the focus of the case.
48. See, e.g., Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283.
49. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580.
50. 22U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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commerce power might also be regulated by a state under its police power, if
there is no actual conflict between the state regulation and federal legisla-
tion.5 ' In Mayor of New York v. Miln, 2 the Court upheld the state's power to
demand that the master of a *vessel provide data concerning the vessel after a
transatlantic voyage. The theory behind Miln was that states have the right to
police their shores, and that a law requiring that certain data be provided by
the masters of vessels was part of the "right, [and] the bounded and solemn
duty of a state, to advance the happiness and prosperity of its people, and to
provide for its general welfare." 5 3 Only the dissent in Gibbons v. Ogden
suggested that the federal commerce power was exclusive.
54
Later, the Passenger Cases invalidated what was then an increasingly
common practice among states, notably Massachusetts and New York, of
demanding outright per person fees ("head taxes") for each alien on board. 5
After the invalidation of the head tax, officials in New York recognized that to
continue to charge such fees would be impermissible. New York, however,
continued to cling to its efforts to "protect" against the entry of so called high
risk aliens, persons who were maimed, blind, or of limited mental capacity.
The new scheme consisted of designating such alien passenger charges as
"commutation fees." This, too, was ultimately deemed impermissible.
In Henderson v. Mayor of New York,56 the Court concluded that notwith-
standing the decision in Mayor of New York v. Miln, it was impermissible for
the State of New York to demand that the master of a ship arriving at the port
of New York from a foreign port report in writing biographical information
on every non-citizen passenger, and then to require the owner or consignee of
the vessel to give a bond for each such person, or in the alternative to give a
fixed sum per passenger. The Court found unpersuasive the State of New
York's argument that the statute was not a regulation of commerce in that the
requested bond was a suitable regulation under the state's police power to
protect against the expense of supporting persons who are "paupers or
diseased, or helpless women and children, coming from foreign countries."-
5 7
51. Id. at 203. In discussing the right of states to enact inspection laws regarding goods, the Court
stated:
That inspection laws may have a remote and considerable influence on commerce will not be
denied; but that a power to regulate commerce is the source from which a right to pass them is
derived, cannot be admitted. The object of the inspection laws, is to improve the quality of the
articles produced by the labor of a country; to fit them for exportation, or, it may be, for domestic
use. They act upon the subject before it becomes an article of foreign commerce, or of commerce
among the States, and prepare it for that purpose. They form an immense portion of legislation,
which embraces everything within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general
government: all which can be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves.
Id.
52. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 103 (1837).
53. Id.
54. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 226.
55. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283.
56. 92 U.S. 259 (1876).
57. Id. at 268.
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Rather, as the Court stated, "[i]n whatever language a statute may be framed,
its purpose must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect" and if it
is apparent that the statute was to compel the payment of monies for every
passenger brought in, it is void.55 It is noteworthy that despite the federal
government's determination that such schemes to impose taxes or payments
for the entering of aliens were impermissible in these cases, the issue was
very clearly one of supremacy of the federal government over the states in
this particular area of "commerce," as immigration was coming to be
viewed. Congress undoubtedly believed that the nature of the schemes used
to charge per person fees in order to guarantee against the entry of undesir-
able aliens was useful in regulating immigration, as the federal government
itself adopted a similar plan in 1882.' 9
Outside of these cases implicating the federal commerce power, there still
existed an entire area of cases in which the states were permitted to act. States
were allowed to act in the area of immigration from early in our history under
circumstances in which the federal government did little in the same arena.
State regulation of immigration can, in fact, be divided into several major
categories of legislation which have been enacted over the history of our
country. 60 The regulation of the movement of criminals, sick, and poor
people was very often linked in the language of immigration statutes.
61
One commonly encountered state regulation addressing immigration lim-
ited the movement of criminals. Some of the original colonies of the United
States often served as lands of exile for convicts from Britain.62 For example,
Georgia was home to a large settlement of persons convicted for nonpayment
of debt.63 An early concern of the colonies was to prevent further importation
of felons.6 4
58. Id. at 268-69.
59. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376,22 Stat. 214.
60. Neuman, supra note 11, at 1840. Neuman's exploration is an historical account of immigration
prior to the twentieth century and attempts to explode the myth that the United States had more or less
open borders prior to the enactment of federal legislation in the 1870s and 1880s.
61. In Henderson, and Commissioners of Immigration v. North German Lloyd, 92 U.S. 259, 268
(1875) the Supreme Court considered statutes from New York and Louisiana which were almost identical
in language. which required ships' captains bringing in immigrants from foreign ports to post bond for all
such passengers. The Court described New York's position as to the purpose of the statute as one "suitable
... under the power of the State to protect its cities and towns from the expense of supporting persons who
are paupers or diseased, or helpless women and children, coming from foreign countries." In Miln, 36 U.S.
at 142, such regulation was seen as "necessary for a state to provide precautionary measures against the
moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts; as it is to guard against the physical
pestilence, which may arise from the unsound and infectious articles imported."
62. J.M. BEATrIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 1660-1800 472 (1986). According to Beattie,
transportation to the Americas took place as early as 1600, principally as a condition of a royal pardon.
63. See generally, PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISON-
MENT FOR DEBT AND BANKRUPTCY 1607-1900 (1974). Coleman notes however that Georgia, like North
Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia, had at one time sought to attract defaulting debtors as settlers
during periods of low immigration to the colonies.
64. Virginia, Maryland and Massachusetts resisted vigorously the entry of convicted felons; Virginia
and Maryland passed laws against it in the 1670s. With the passage of the English Transportation Act in
1718 and thus increased numbers of transports, Virginia again responded with legislation, which was
however, disallowed by England. BEATTIE, supra note 62, at 479, 505.
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Another area of immigration concern was public health regulation. States
have long legislated on the subject of health and immigration. In Compagnie
Francaise De Navigation A Vapeur v. Louisiana,6' a French steamship
company challenged the State of Louisiana's enforcement of a statute which
empowered local boards of health to exclude healthy persons from localities
infested with contagious or infectious disease, without regard to whether
such person came from within or outside the state. With the growth of the
tuberculosis epidemic in the late 1800s, those carrying the disease were often
branded as immoral and careless, and many states took stringent measures to
stop the entry of such persons.66
State statutes regulating the immigration of the poor were very often based
upon the English poor law system of settlement.67 In Massachusetts, for
example, legislation enacted in 1794 imposed a penalty on anyone who
knowingly brought a pauper or indigent into any town in the Commonwealth,
and failed to remove such person.68 Over the next several years, Massachu-
setts amended its regulations to require payment of bonds or security, a
practice which was challenged and ultimately overturned by the Supreme
Court. 6 9 The state of Massachusetts still persisted in its efforts to prevent the
entry of impoverished persons, amending and modifying its regulations
several times during the nineteenth century.7"
In addition to the state immigration regulations affecting criminals, the
sick, and the poor, there were also more specific state regulations regarding
slavery and the movement of blacks, both slave and free. It has been argued
that such regulations do not properly fit into any discussion of immigration,
with the most often cited reason being that slavery was not voluntary
movement on the part of the slaves. 7' However, immigration regulations
affecting criminals, the poor and the sick, categories more readily accepted as
belonging to a discussion of immigration regulations, very often involved an
aspect of "involuntary" transportation. 72 Thus, it was clear early on that the
65. 186 U.S. 380(1900).
66. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Tuberculosis and the Power of the State: Toward the Development of
Rational Standards for the Review of Compulsory Public Health Powers, 2 U. CHI. L. Scm. ROUNDTABLE
2190, 2201 (1995) ("Like the modem HIV epidemic, there were innocent, as well as guilty, victims of
tuberculosis. For some, tuberculosis was merely an unfortunate result of underlying social conditions-
crowded housing, poor sanitation, inadequate nutrition due to poverty.").
67. Neuman, supra note I1, at 1848.
68. Id. at 1849.
69. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283.
70. Neuman, supra note 11, at 1849-51.
71. Id. at 1837. Neuman offers a counter to this argument by citing to Plyler v Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
219-20 (1982). In Plyler v. Doe, the court speaks of children of illegal immigrants as being unlike their
parents, who, having "elect[aed to enter our territory by stealth and in violation of our law should be
prepared to bear the consequences, including, but not limited, to deportation." 457 U.S. at 219-20. The
children in such instances "can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status." Id.
72. Criminals were often given no choice as to whether they were transported; this was also true of the
infirm and the poor, who often found themselves being transported to America due to a series of reasons
which left so little to the will of the immigrant as to be considered compulsory. See generally BEATrIE,
supra note 62.
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vast majority of immigration legislation which existed in the early years of
this country was at the state level.73
With the increase in the enactment of federal pronouncements regarding
immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it became
increasingly clear that such state legislation could and would be challenged
on Supremacy Clause grounds, going beyond specific Commerce Clause
concerns. A seminal case involving such a challenge was Hines v. Davidow-
itz.7 4 In Hines, an appeal was taken from a district court decree which
restrained the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania from enforcing the provisions
of the Pennsylvania Registration Act against an alien. The Pennsylvania
Registration Act 75 required all aliens age eighteen or older, with some
exceptions, to register each year and provide certain information enumerated
by statute, as well as other information and details that the Pennsylvania
Department of Labor might request. Further, aliens were required to pay a
one dollar annual registration fee, and receive and carry an alien registration
card at all times, which could be demanded at any time by any police officer
or agent of the Department of Labor and Industry. Production of the card was
also required in order to obtain a license to drive or to register a motor
vehicle. Those non-exempt aliens who failed to register were subject to a fine
of not more than one hundred dollars and imprisonment for not more than
sixty days, or both. Failure to carry or exhibit the card was also punishable by
fine or imprisonment.
The appellants challenged the Pennsylvania statute on four grounds: 1)
that the act was invalid in that it attempted to regulate an area wherein the
national law was supreme; 2) that the act denied equal protection of the laws
to aliens residing in Pennsylvania; 3) that the act exceeded Pennsylvania's
constitutional power in requiring registration of aliens without the consent of
Congress; and 4) that the act violated Section 16 of the Civil Rights Act of
1870.76 The Court quickly dispensed with all but the Supremacy Clause
claim, finding that in the context presented it was necessary only to decide
the issue of whether the Congress had, by its actions, foreclosed enforcement
of Pennsylvania's registration law.
7 7
73. Neuman, supra note I1.
74. 312 U.S. 52 (1940).
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, H§ 1801-06 (1940).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988). This statute was formerly codified in Title 8, U.S. Code, Aliens and
Nationality, 16 Stat. 140, 144, 8 U.S.C. § 41: "All persons within thejurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other."
77. Hines, 312 U.S. at 62. Although the Hines Court declined to decide the issue of whether § 16 of
the Civil Rights Act prevented discrimination against aliens in the setting, the issue was later settled in
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). It is interesting to note that while § 16 was
pars of the post slavery legislation intended to assure the rights of freed slaves, it was at one point included




Shortly after the enactment of Pennsylvania's registration law, Congress
enacted its own registration law. 78 The federal act called for a single, as
opposed to an annual, registration of all aliens age fourteen or older, as well
as for the provision of any additional information which might be prescribed
by the Commissioner with the approval of the Attorney General. The federal
act also called for the finger-printing of all registrants and the secrecy of all
files. There was no requirement that aliens carry a registration card, and only
the willful failure to register was made a criminal offense. 79 Given the federal
statute, the Court found for the appellants, stating that "the regulation of
aliens is so intimately blended and intertwined with the responsibilities of the
national government, that where it acts, and the state also acts on the same
subject, 'the act of Congress ... is supreme; and the law of the State, though
enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.' ,,so
The Court in Hines, though making an important statement concerning
when state legislation may conflict with federal legislation, declined to
provide any ground rules for analysis of other such cases; the Court instead
referred to a variety of standards employed in making such conclusions in
prior cases."' The reach of Hines is therefore limited to its facts.
In modem case law it is well settled that in certain instances the states may
act in the area of immigration. Generally, such Supremacy Clause analysis
starts with a discussion of De Canas v. Bica.82 In De Canas, the Supreme
Court recognized that the states do have some authority to act with respect to
illegal aliens where such actions are in keeping with federal objectives and
further a legitimate state goal. De Canas clearly enunciates that simply
because a statute has aliens as its subject, it is not per se invalid. In other
words, there is no congressional intent to "occupy the field" of immigra-
tion. 83 Rather, De Canas sets forth the following criteria for determining
whether a state statute that concerns "illegal aliens" is preempted by federal
78. The Alien Registration Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988), was enacted in 1940. Act of June 28, 1940,
ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670.
79. Although at the time of enactment, as the Court in Hines notes at 312 U.S. 60-61, there was no
requirement that aliens carry with them a registration card "to be exhibited to the police," subsequent
amendment of the federal legislation resulted in just such a requirement. 8 U.S.C. § 1304 explicitly
requires that aliens over the age of eighteen shall carry or have in their possession at all times any
certificate of alien registration or alien registration receipt card issued to him pursuant to the original 1940
Act.
80. Hines, 312 U.S. at 66.
81. Id. at 67. The court stated:
There is not-and from the very nature of the problem there cannot be-any rigid formula or rule
which can be used as a universal pattern to determine the meaning and purpose of every act of
Congress. This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties or federal laws
touching the same subject, has made use of the following expressions: conflicting, contrary to;
occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtail-
ment; and interference. But none of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or
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immigration law: 1) Whether the statute is a constitutionally proscribedregulation of immigration; 2) Whether such state regulation, even if not
preempted by the Supremacy Clause, is required because the "nature of the
subject permits no other conclusion" or because "Congress has ordained it;"
and 3) Whether the statute burdens or conflicts in any manner with any
federal statutes or treaties.8
Applying the first criterion of De Canas to Proposition 187, whether the
statute is a prohibited regulation of immigration, requires a close look at the
statute's provisions. Regulation of immigration has been defined as a determi-
nation of who should or should not be admitted into the country, the
conditions under which legal entrants should remain, regulation of their
conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their natural-
ization." States are granted no such powers under the Constitution; there-
fore, they can neither add to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed
by Congress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the
United States.86
Does Proposition 187, with its focus on aliens, run up against the
Supremacy Clause and fall flat on its provisions? Such a result would mean a
determination that the initiative in its entirety was an attempt to legislate in
the area of immigration in a way the states were not permitted. This result is
unlikely, since, as was clear in De Canas, states may legislate in the area of
immigration and are free to create regulations which would not conflict with
federal provisions.
The first section of the initiative, concerning the penalties for the manufac-
ture, distribution, and sale of documents to conceal citizenship closely
parallels federal provisions regarding these activities. 7 The next provision
concerns the cooperation of local law enforcement agencies in California
with the INS.88 Mandating cooperation between the agencies of the state and
local government with the federal government does not, on its face, suggest a
constitutionally impermissible scheme. Even the establishment of a system
of required notification can be viewed as complementary to federal notifica-
tion systems.
As to whether the "nature of the subject permits no other conclusion," or
that "the Congress has unmistakably so ordained," the opponents of Proposi-
tion 187 have a great burden to uphold. The De Canas court indicated that
"[s]tates possess a broad authority under their police powers to regulate the
employment relationship to protect workers within the State. Child labor
laws, minimum and other wage laws, laws affecting occupational health and
safety, and workmen's compensation laws are only a few examples." ' 89 If the
84. Id.
85. Hines, 312 U.S. at 69.
86. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410,419 (1948).
87. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (1992).
88. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834b (a) (West 1995).
89. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 356.
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purpose of Proposition 187 is, as the preamble states, to protect California
citizens from "injury," is the regulation then a health and welfare statute
which similarly would be permissible under the state's broad power?90 Or is
it essentially an economic regulation, in which case it may be subject to an
entirely different scrutiny?
IV. PREEMPTION AND BEYOND-SOME ADDITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL
CONCERNS
Once De Canas established that the states can indeed legislate in the area
of immigration, the most immediate stumbling block to the validity of any
such legislation under the Supremacy Clause becomes whether there is any
federal legislation to counter the state legislation. In the wake of De Canas, a
preemption analysis of immigration-related state legislation can go only as
far as existing conflicting federal statutes will take it. Given the fact that
federal legislation may, under political and other pressures, change to restrict
alien and immigrant rights, a full and cogent analysis would seem to almost
require one to go beyond preemption issues in considering the constitutional-
ity of the various provisions. Though ripeness and standing issues raised by
the provisions may limit the potential for frontal challenges to the statute,
these issues are nonetheless well worth considering. 9
A. Findings and Declarations
The nature of the "personal injury" suffered, or of the "criminal conduct"
referred to in the Findings and Declarations section of Proposition 187 is not
clear. Even if it is made clear, the "right" to be protected from such an injury
is equally vague. The states, as well as the federal government, clearly have
the power to create criminal laws or other legislation which protects the life
and property of individual citizens from intrusion from other private citizens.
This is generally considered part of a state's power to legislate in the area of
health, safety and welfare.9 2 This protection is not, however, a "right" in the
sense of a liberty interest. As the Court noted in Deshaney v. Winnebago
90. Under the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, states have broad latitude in legislating in
the area of health and welfare.
91. For example, potential challengers may be limited in their attempts to bring challenges to sections
of the initiative which present search and seizure issues under the Fourth Amendment, such as the Penal
Code sections (see Appendix), as such challenges require an actual injury to the claimant. However, it may
be interesting to speculate as to the reach of the Fourth Amendment in a case where an individual is
required to provide vital and possibly harmful information about himself. In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589
(1977), the Court discussed in a footnote the possibility of a broader liberty interest from the Fourth
Amendment, the right to privacy. The appellees cited to language in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1961)). Declining to find a right to privacy under the Fourth
Amendment, the Court in Whalen v. Roe indicated that Terry and Katz involved "affirmative, unan-
nounced, narrowly focused intrusions into individual privacy during the course of criminal investiga-
tions." 429 U.S. at 604 n.32. If in fact such a right to privacy could be found to exist under the Fourth
Amendment, then conceivably statutes infringing on that right might be subject to immediate challenge.
92. The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution permits the states to regulate the conduct of
individuals through their police power.
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County Department of Social Services, "nothing in the language of the Due
Process Clause itself requires the state to protect the life, liberty and property
of its citizens against invasion by private actors." 93
Given the economic climate surrounding Proposition 187, it is most likely
that the "personal injury" referred to in the introduction is a reference to
economic harm. Forty percent of the undocumented aliens that have entered
the United States are now in California. 94 The government of California
spends over eight billion dollars each year for aliens both legal and illegal.95
The government of California recently estimated that it spends 2.1 billion
dollars per year to educate illegal alien children (though this estimate is
thought to be eight hundred million dollars too high).96 Clearly, there can be
some redress for economic harm, but can such redress be in the form of a
regulation which calls for criminal penalties for violators?
97
No part of a statute may be deemed valid if it has an impermissible
purpose, such as to discriminate.9 8 Despite its lack of clarity, the findings and
declarations clause may, to some extent, save Proposition 187 from a direct
finding that it has such an impermissible purpose. The stated purpose of
curbing the negative economic impact is not however, in and of itself, enough
to support a constitutional challenge.99
B. Penal Code Amendments
State cooperation with federal laws, and enforcement of the laws, is
generally permissible.' It has been explicitly held that where state enforce-
ment activities do not impair federal regulatory interests concurrent enforce-
ment activity is permitted.' 0 ' However, some provisions of the penal code
93. 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
94. Deborah Sontag, Illegal Aliens Put Uneven Load on States, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,
1994, atAI4, citing statistics from a study by the Urban Institute.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Economic harm is a tort which is recognized by a number of causes of actions in various states.
Whether such harm is a subject for state action or prosecution is entirely another matter, except where that
harm is through fraud or other identifiably criminal activities. In such matters, an individual might have
redress in both the civil and the criminal arenas.
98. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
99. Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805 (1989). In Calfarm, the California Supreme Court
reviewed a proposition which imposed reductions in insurance rates, and required the approval of the state
Insurance Commissioner for any increases in rates. The statute also limited the power of insurers to refuse
to renew policies. Insurers challenged the rollback and reduction provisions as being violative of the
United States and California Constitutions in that the provisions were arbitrary, discriminatory and
confiscatory. The court reviewed the challenged provisions and found that only one aspect of the statute
was constitutionally impermissible, in that it deprived insurers of a fair and reasonable rate of return. In
looking at the statute, the stated purpose of which was to relieve Californians of the burden of high
insurance rates, the court stated, quoting from Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978): "We do not consider or weigh the economic or social wisdom or
general propriety of the initiative. Rather, our sole function is to evaluate [it] legally in the light of
established constitutional standards." Id. at 814.
100. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1953); Miller v. California, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
101. Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
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amendments implicate personal rights and appear to go beyond what the
Ninth Circuit has permitted in this area. Examples of this are seen in those
provisions which permit questioning and verification of whether the person
arrested is present "in violation of federal immigration laws." In Gonzales v.
City of Peoria,0 2 eleven persons of Mexican descent brought an action
against the city of Peoria, Arizona and some of its police officers and public
officials. The claim was that city police, acting under city policies, had
engaged in a practice of stopping and arresting persons who appeared to be of
Mexican descent based only on their race, without reasonable suspicion or
probable cause. The individual claimants involved alleged that they had been
stopped by police and were required to provide identification or proof of
legal presence in the United States, and that persons who did not carry
identification or documentation were detained at the county jail for release to
immigration authorities. They alleged violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and the Civil Rights Act of 187 1.
After a finding for the defendants in the district court, the plaintiffs
appealed. The Court of Appeals considered three issues stemming from the
appellants' claims, the first and most important of which was whether the
Peoria City Police had the authority under state and federal statutes to arrest
for violations of the immigration law.'
0 3
The court in Gonzales found that while federal law does not preclude local
law officers from enforcing criminal provisions of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act, and in some instances permits arrests for certain of those
criminal provisions, this authorization is explicitly limited to the criminal
provisions of the Act."0 What this means is that Proposition 187's require-
ments that law enforcement officers "verify" whether a person is simply in
the United States "in violation of immigration laws" may exceed the scope
of its authority, as such an inquiry may concern civil violations rather than
criminal ones. Gonzales gives several examples of when a person might be
present in the country in violation of immigration laws, yet not have
committed a criminal offense. 10 5 Moreover, even as to criminal violations of
102. 722 F2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983).
103- Id. at 476. The Ninth Circuit also considered whether the City and the individual defendants, were
liable to the appellants for damages and alleged deprivation of their constitutional rights (discussing
appellants claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), and whether the appellants were entitled to equitable relief to
prevent future constitutional violations. Id. at 477.
104. Id. at 475-76.
105. The Court stated:
Many of the problems arising from the implementation of the City's written policies have derived
from a failure to distinguish between civil and criminal violations of the [Immigration and
Naturalization] Act. Several of the policy statements use the term "illegal alien," which obscures
the distinction between the civil and criminal violations .... There are numerous reasons why a
person could be illegally present in the United States without having entered in violation of section
1325 [8 U.S.C. § 1325, prohibiting unlawful entry, a crime]. Examples include expiration of a
visitor's visa, change of student status, or acquisition of prohibited employment.
Id- at 476.
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immigration law, not all offenses are subject to criminal penalties. In INS v.
Rincon-Jimenez, the Ninth Circuit held that the crime of entering without
inspection is not a "continuing offense" such as would subject a person to
arrest or prosecution after the time of entry. 1
0 6
Proponents of Proposition 187 may point to the fact that the section
regarding law enforcement concerns inquiries made after a person has been
arrested, and thus, the holding in Gonzales is inapplicable as to what areas
into which an officer may inquire. While it is true that in Gonzales the claim
was that officers stopped and arrested the claimants based only on their
suspicions regarding their national origin or legal status in the country, and
not on any other independent grounds, it is not clear that Proposition 187
requires such independent grounds for an arrest before a law enforcement
officer can begin the "verification" process. The language of the section
states that the officers will begin the process regarding a person who is
arrested "if he or she is suspected of being in violation of federal immigration
laws." 10 7 Does this mean an arrest that took place on independent grounds,
or does it refer to an arrest that took place for the reason that, "if," the person
is suspected of the immigration violation?
A local law enforcement officer may question a person about whether he
has a "green card."'O However, a stop or arrest based solely on a person's
apparent "foreign" appearance is impermissible.' 0 9 Moreover, even the
lowest level of law enforcement intrusion, the "investigatory stop," requires
at least reasonable suspicion that some crime is afoot."0 Interestingly
enough, the phrase "reasonable suspicion," while used liberally throughout
other sections of Proposition 187, is conspicuously absent in the section on
law enforcement.''
Though possibly this absence is the result of an oversight, the drafters of
the provision could very likely have been operating under the belief that
aliens illegally present in the United States have fewer Fourth Amendment
protections. It is true that aliens at the border have very limited Fourth
Amendment protection, 1 2 and that aliens may not assert the exclusionary
106. 595 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1979). But see INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984)(finding that
entry after deportation is a continuing crime).
107. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834b(a)(West 1995)(emphasis added).
108. A "green card" is an alien registration card, which is actually salmon colored. Federal law
requires all persons over the age of 18 to carry the card. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (1992). See United States v.
Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298, 1301 (10th Cir. 1984)(holding that a state trooper has general
investigatory authority to inquire into immigration violations).
109. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
110. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
111. Sections where the "reasonable suspicion" language appears are: CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 10001.5 (West 1995) (public social services); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CooE § 130 (West 1995) (health
care); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215 (West 1995)(primary and secondary education); CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 66010.8 (West 1995) (post-secondary education).
112. United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985). In Montoya De Hernandez,
the court stated: "Since the founding of our Republic, Congress has granted the Executive plenary
authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border without probable cause or a warrant, in
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rule for violations of the Fourth Amendment in deportation proceedings." 3
However, aliens, even those unlawfully present in the country, may assert
Fourth Amendment rights in criminal proceedings."' Moreover, despite
lessened Fourth Amendment rights at the border," 5 the standard for a
detention, beyond a routine customs search, is reasonable suspicion." 6 The
verification process which takes place after an arrest may also trigger
concerns about the possibility of self-incrimination. Ostensibly, any question-
ing regarding immigration status which takes place under the mandate of
Proposition 187 would occur after an arrest and therefore after the warning
required by Miranda v. Arizona had been given." 1
7
The sections amending the penal code requiring that arrested persons be
notified of their status as aliens present in the country in violation of
immigrations laws and informing them that they must either obtain legal
status or leave, would appear to go beyond the scope of what local law
enforcement officials may do under current law. Determinations as to who
may stay in the country are made exclusively by the federal government.' '
Even aliens who may be subject to such a determination are entitled to some
minimal due process, even when they have not actually entered the coun-
try." 9 Thus, a notice telling an individual to simply obtain legal status or
leave appears to be blatantly defective.
The provisions of the penal code requiring the state Attorney General and
the INS be notified of the apparent illegal status of an arrestee, and requiring
provision of additional information requested by those entities are in keeping
with what has been permitted in other state settings. For instance, in United
States v. Salinas-Calderon120 a Kansas highway patrolman stopped a vehicle
which appeared to be driving erratically, and subsequently obtained informa-
tion that led him to believe that at least some of the occupants had violated
immigration laws. The trooper's detention of the occupants of the car while
he contacted the INS was held permissible.
12
order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country."
Id. at 537.
113. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
114. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
115. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973). Almeida-Sanchez gives
examples of functional equivalents to the border, such as international airports and stations near the
border.
116. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541.
117. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), holds that prior to any questioning after a person has
been taken into custody, the person must be informed of his right to remain silent and be assured of a
"continuous opportunity" to exercise that right. To this end, the accused must be informed that: (1) he has
a right to remain silent (2) that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and (3)
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. However, in INS v.
Lopez-Medina, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984), the Court referred to numerous Court of Appeals decisions
holding that the absence of Miranda warnings does not render an otherwise voluntary statement
inadmissiblefor deportation purposes.
118. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1984).
119. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
120. 728 F.2d 1298.
121. id. at 1301-02.
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C. Exclusion of Aliens from Public Social Services
The attempt to limit public benefits to aliens who have been termed either
lawful permanent residents or lawful temporary residents raises questions in
light of the holding in Holley v. Lavine.122 In Holley, the State of New York
enacted a regulation which provided that an alien who is unlawfully residing
in the United States shall not be eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC). The plaintiff was a Canadian citizen who entered the
United States as a temporary non-immigrant student at the age of twelve, and
remained in the United States even after she married and bore six children.
She later separated from her husband and applied for AFDC, which she
received for herself and her six children. After New York enacted its
regulation, her benefits were terminated. Following unsuccessful appeals to
state authorities, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the district court, against the
Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services and the
Commissioner of the Monroe County Department of Social Services. When
the case was eventually heard on the merits, the plaintiff failed at the district
court level, whereupon an appeal was taken to the Second Circuit.
There was no contest as to whether federal law governed the payment of
AFDC benefits, since there was clearly a federal law on point.' 2 3 However,
federal regulations implementing federal law required that a state plan shall
include otherwise eligible individuals who were either citizens of the United
States, lawful permanent residents, or persons otherwise residing in the
United States under color of law. '
24
The court in Holley set out to define the phrase "under color of law." The
State of New York, unable to offer background material to the court to aid in
its determination, nonetheless asked the court to take judicial notice that
"millions of persons are unlawfully in the United States" and that their
presence was "the cause of major financial burdens to the states and the
nation because these illegal aliens claim unearned benefits from welfare
systems." 125 The court found that the plaintiff fit into a very particular
category in that she had revealed her situation to the INS, and had received a
letter which stated that the INS had not initiated deportation proceedings
against her, and that it had no immediate plans to do so.
To reach the finding that the plaintiff did in fact reside in the United States
under color of law, the court narrowed its inquiry to the circumstances in the
plaintiff's case, where there were official assurances that there would be no
deportation proceedings in the immediate future. However, in defining the
122. 553 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1977).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1992), the national Social Security Act, authorized the payment of funds to
states which had submitted and had received approval of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare,
plans for aid and services to needy families with children. The regulations implementing this section were
codified at 45 C.ER. § 233.50 (1995).
124. 553 F.2d at 848-49.
125. id at 849.
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phrase "under color of law," the court did not confine itself to the narrow
facts of the plaintiff's situation, stating that "the phrase obviously includes
actions not covered by specific authorizations of law. It embraces not only
situations within the body of the law, but also others enfolded by a colorable
limitation. 'Under color of law' means that which an official does by virtue of
power, as well as what he does by virtue of right." 1
26
Arguably, proponents of the provisions providing services to only limited
classes of legally admitted aliens could rely on Sudomir v. McMahon.127 In
Sudomir, illegal aliens residing in California who had applied for political
asylum were found not to be permanent residents under color of law and were
therefore ineligible for AFDC benefits. The court in Sudomir found that
asylum applicants were not PRUCOL 128 because their presence had not been
officially sanctioned by the INS. Sudomir notwithstanding, many cases since
Holley v. Lavine have given greater rather than less breadth to the meaning of
"under color of law" as it relates to PRUCOL status. With few exceptions, it
has been the case that where the INS knows of the presence of aliens and fails
to act on deportation the presence of such aliens can be said to be under color
of law. '
29
Given the holding in Holley v. Lavine, a statute such as Proposition 187
which would grant public social services only to persons who are citizens or
lawfully admitted temporary or permanent residents, while ignoring those
persons who have obtained PRUCOL status, seems to be impermissible.
Conceivably, the provision regarding persons lawfully admitted for a tempo-
rary period of time130 could apply to PRUCOL aliens, but after the court's
explication in Holley v. Lavine, there is certainly no requirement that a
PRUCOL alien have been lawfully admitted. Further, there is no requirement
that an individual be here for a temporary period, though, as in the case of the
plaintiff in Holley v. Lavine, such temporary status may well be the start of
what develops into PRUCOL status. Of course, in light of recent changes
rendered by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1996, there may be a move towards redefining notions of
PRUCOL status as it relates to means-tested programs. 
1 3 1
126. Id.
127. 767 E2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1985).
128. PRUCOL is an acronym for permanent resident under color of law, and is frequently used as
shorthand method for describing persons who are present in the United States with the implicit, if not the
explicit authorization of the INS.
129. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Solis, 580 So. 2d 146, 148 (Fla. 199 1). In Solis,
the Florida Supreme Court found that applicants for political asylum were eligible for PRUCOL status as
defined by Holley v. Lavine. Solis cites to numerous cases wherein Holley v. Lavine has been followed,
among them: Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556 (2d Cir. 1985) (concerning supplemental social security
benefits); Industrial Comm'n v. Arteaga, 725 P.2d 473 (Colo. 1987) (unemployment benefits); St. Francis
Hospital v. D'Elia, 422 N.Y.S.2d 104 (App. Div. 1979) (medical assistance), affid, 422 N.E.2d 830 (N.Y.
1981); and Cruz v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 478 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 1985) (medicaid).
130. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5 (b)(3) (West 1995).
131. See supra note 9. The new Act limits eligibility for means-tested programs to those who are
lawful permanent residents who have worked for particular periods of time or have been present in the
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The section requiring notification to other agencies would probably be
found permissible, in light of existing federal and state information sharing
provisions already in place. 132 However, the notice to aliens provisions, as
indicated above in the discussion of amendments to the Penal Code, would
probably be found impermissible in light of the superior federal role in
deportation. It is curious that the rules governing notification to aliens
regarding public social services require that aliens be told of their apparent
illegal status in writing, while in the law enforcement setting such notice may
apparently be given verbally. The reasons for this are not clear, however, one
may speculate that since in a law enforcement setting information of
constitutional magnitude is commonly given verbally (e.g., Miranda warn-
ings), there is little concern for written notice in this context.1 33 Moreover,
the written notice given in the area of public benefits may be an attempt to
address due process concerns implicated in the denial of public benefits.'
34
V. EXCLUSION FROM SOCIAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, like other protec-
tions afforded by that amendment, extends to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, regardless of nationality. 35 The provisions
of Proposition 187 which appear to most burden these interests are those
provisions which provide for "informing" the alien that he is in the country
illegally, and then directing him either to correct his status or leave the
country. This amounts to deportation without a hearing. Even aside from the
Supremacy Clause issues which would not permit deportation by a state, if
allowed, such a proceeding would require due process.' 36 These provisions
fly in the face of long established notions of the procedural due process
doctrine which have developed over the years.
country for particular periods. Though there are provisions for those like refugees or asylees who would
have fit generally under traditional definitions of PRUCOL, it is unclear that a person such as the claimant
in Holley v. Lavine would now be eligible for benefits.
132. An example is the federal SHARE program regarding INS information.
133. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court held that when an
individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom by the authorities, procedural safeguards
must be employed to protect the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court provided that unless some
other effective means are employed to inform individuals of their right to remain silent, and to assure that
the exercise of the right will be honored, authorities must notify individuals of their right to remain silent,
that anything said may be used against him in a court of law, that there is a right to have an attorney present
during questioning, and that if an individual desires an attorney and cannot afford one, one will be
provided without cost. In providing for these very important safeguards, the Court speaks of the need to
inform the accused of his rights via "effective and express explanations," and does not require a writing to
satisfy this requirement. Id. at 473. While the Court discusses the taking of a confession or statement in
writing, Id. at 486, there is no prescription as to how exactly the rights should be given. As the Court states,
"the Constitution does not require any specific code of procedures for protecting the privilege against
self-incrimination during custodial interrogation." Id. at 490.
134. See infra discussion of procedural due process.
135. YickWov. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
136. See id
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Historically, the Court has relied upon the premise that procedural due
process must be based upon some underlying liberty or property right which
is derived from either the state's positive law or some constitutional provi-
sion other than the Due Process Clause. 137 It is clear, however that in the area
of social and medical benefits, some very specific and clear processes are
due. For a state agency to determine that there is a reasonable suspicion to
believe that a person has no legal immigration status and then deny services
which that person had previously received or been deemed eligible for,
amounts to a deprivation of a protected property interest. 138
In Goldberg v. Kelly, 139 New York City residents receiving funds from
federal AFDC or New York state's assistance program claimed that officials
administering the programs had terminated, or were about to terminate
benefits without prior notice or hearing, and that they were therefore being
denied due process of law. Although no provisions existed for any hearing or
notice of any kind, prior to the complaints, after they were filed, state and city
officials adopted procedures for notice and hearing. Those complaining then
challenged the constitutional sufficiency of these procedures. The district
court found for the claimants, whereupon state officials appealed.
The amended state regulations which were the subject of the challenge
required, among other things, that the local procedure must include giving
the recipient a notice of the reasons for the termination at least seven days
prior to the effective date of the proposed discontinuance or suspension. '
40
There was also a requirement that the recipient be notified that upon request,
the recipient could have the proposal reviewed by a local welfare official
holding a position superior to that of the supervisor who approved the
proposed discontinuance or suspension. The recipient could also submit a
written statement demonstrating why his grant should not be discontinued or
suspended.' 4 ' The regulations further provided for expeditious review, and
137. Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and Administrative Law, 72 CAL. L. Rev. 1044, 1045 (1984).
Rubin cites to Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976), in support of his ideas. In Meachum v. Fano, an
inmate at a state prison argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitled him to a
hearing before being transferred to a prison with less favorable conditions. Meachum is to a great degree
tailored to situations which involve imprisonment and the procedures which are due in a situation wherein
a person has already been duly convicted and thus properly subject to the loss of some liberty rights. It
does, however, speak generally to what types of losses can be addressed under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment:
We reject at the outset the notion that any grievous loss visited upon a person by the State is
sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause. In Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), a university professor was deprived of his job, a loss which was surely
a matter of great substance, but because the professor had no property interest in his position, due
process procedures were not required in connection with his dismissal. We therefore held that it is
the nature of the interest involved rather than its weight.
Id. at 224.
138. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Application for Temporary Restraining
Order at 51, Gregorio T. v. Wilson (Case No. 94-7654).
139. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
140. Id. at 258.
141. Id.
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expressly forbade the discontinuance or suspension of the benefits prior to
the sending of notice or prior to the proposed effective date, whichever came
latest. '4 2
The holding in Goldberg v. Kelly requiring that the state provide a very
specific notice and hearing to recipients subject to loss of benefits would
appear to invalidate the notice provisions written into Proposition 187.143
And yet, even given the detailed provisions of the New York regulations in
Goldberg, the Court on review found that only a pretermination procedure
would satisfy the demands of due process where welfare is concerned.' 44 As
the Court in Goldberg v. Kelly stated, "for qualified recipients, welfare
provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing and medical
care." 145 The Court noted, just as the drafters of Proposition 187 undoubt-
edly recognized in including both social services and medical care, those
ineligible for welfare assistance are very often rendered ineligible for
participation in state medical programs. 1
46
Are aliens included in any contemplation of due process rights in the area
of social services or medical benefits? In Goldberg v. Kelly, the court seemed
to include them, if we take literally the Court's words on the history of due
process in this country: "From its founding, the Nation's basic commitment
has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its
borders." ' 4 7 This reference falls squarely in line with what had already been
stated in Yick Wo v. Hopkins 4 8 and Shaughnessy v. Mezei.
49
Goldberg v. Kelly does not stand, however, as a bulwark against any
attempted deprivation of benefits; the holding will not, it appears, protect
those persons who have not previously applied and qualified for benefits.
Board of Regents v. Roth'5 0 is fairly clear in stating that such procedural
process applies only to those interests or rights which the claimant presently
enjoys."' Conceivably, aliens who have not previously applied for social
service or non-emergency medical benefits may derive no protection from
142. Id.
143. In May of 1995, the State of California indicated that it would not, contrary to its earlier
assertions, prepare regulations for the implementation of Proposition 187. Commentators have suggested
that the reason for this is the State's intention to assert United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), for
the proposition that a challenger to the constitutionality of a legislative act bears the burden of showing
that there is no set of circumstances under which the act might be valid. However, it would appear that a
more effective strategy would he to draft regulations, since in Salerno, one of the principal factors in the
Court's approval of the legislation in question (a bail reform act) was that "the procedures by which a
judicial officer evaluates the likelihood of future dangerousness are specifically designed to further the
accuracy of that determination." 481 U.S. at 751. Drafting of such regulations might also be useful to
asserting the validity of Proposition 187 given the regulatory roadmap provided by Goldberg v. Kelly.
144. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 263-64 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 264.
146. Id. at 264 n.11.
147. Id. at 264-65.
148. 118 U.S. at 369.
149. 345 U.S.at 212.
150. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
151. Id.
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Goldberg v. Kelly. Additionally, the recently enacted Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Act of 1996152 diminishes the guaranties of Goldberg
v. Kelly for citizens as well as for aliens on welfare. This being the case, we
may yet see the development of a new procedural due process standard in this
area.
A. Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Publicly-Funded Health Care Services
Like the provisions on public benefits, the provisions purporting to limit
medical services are objectionable given the potentially wide category of
aliens who are neither lawfully admitted permanent or temporary residents,
yet who may be considered PRUCOL and thus eligible for services under
federal law.' 3 The provisions requiring notification to the State Director of
Social Services, the Attorney General of the United States and the INS,
however, also present issues regarding the right to privacy in medical
treatment.
In Whalen v. Roe, a group of physicians and patients brought suit
challenging the constitutionality of a New York statute which required that
the state be provided with a copy of every prescription for certain drugs and
which also provided security measures to protect that information once in the
state's possession. 54 The claimants argued that the provisions were an
unreasonable exercise of the state's police power, and the doctor-claimants
argued more specifically that the statute impaired their rights to practice
medicine free from unwarranted interference from the state. The bulk of the
challenges concerned the invasion of protected Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interests. Claimants believed that there was a possibility that a doctor
or other person handling the information might disclose privileged informa-
tion, that the security provisions would be improperly administered and that
patients would be subjected to the revelation of confidential information.
The Supreme Court found against the physicians and patients on all of
their claims. The Court went to great lengths in its opinion regarding the
rejected privacy claims. Such claims, the Court indicated, usually fit into two
distinct categories: one where there is an individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters; and another where the individual interest is in
making important decisions independently. 55 The physicians and doctors
argued that both types of privacy were implicated in their case, in that the
mere existence of a readily available data bank of patient information made
some patients reluctant to use and some doctors reluctant to prescribe certain
152. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
153. The National Immigration Law Center, in its publication GUIDE TO ALIEN ELIGIBILITY FOR
FEDERAL PROGRAMS (3d ed. 1994), finds that there are at least four categories of aliens who, though not
lawful permanent residents, may be eligible for medicaid services: those granted "Family Unity;" those
who have been classed as refugees or asylees; Cuban and Haitian parolees; those granted Deferred
Enforced Departure; and asylum applicants.
154. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
155. Id. at 599.
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drugs. 156 In rejecting these privacy claims, the Court indicated that it is
always possible that private information might be disclosed to the public, and
that the ways in which this might occur were not sufficient reasons for
invalidating the statute on privacy grounds. As to the concern about private
disclosure to the New York Department of Health, the Court stated that the
disclosures required by the statute were -not sufficiently different from those
which had been previously required under prior law, and did not differ
meaningfully from other "unpleasant invasions of privacy" which are
associated with health care. 157 The Court cited to several examples where
disclosure of private medical information is required by statute: reporting
requirements relating to venereal disease, child abuse, injuries caused by
deadly weapons, and certifications of fatal death. 158 The Court also cited to
the need for insurers to know private medical information about patients. 59
One way in which the reporting required by health care facilities in
Proposition 187 differs from the examples cited by the Court in Whalen v.
Roe is that health care facilities are required under Proposition 187 to reveal
patient information to organizations who are in no way concerned with either
child welfare, mortality, or any other matter within the purview of public
health or welfare. Proposition 187's reporting requirement in this area is also
not necessary to the completion of a private health care function such as
payment of bills by an insurer.
The Court in Whalen dispensed with the physicians' claim that the New
York statute impaired their right to practice medicine free from unwarranted
interference. The Court reached this conclusion in part because previous
statutes had required similar reporting of doctors, and thus the new statute
added no additional or different burdens. More importantly, the Court found
that to the extent that doctors had any claim at all regarding the possibility
that the statute might induce patients to refuse medication, it was derived
from their patients' own claims. Having already rejected the patients' claims
on the issue, the Court disposed of the physicians' claim as well. 160
Applying the Court's finding on the issue of a doctor's right to practice
medicine uninhibited by the state to burdens placed on health care facilities
by Proposition 187 would not necessarily result in a like finding. First, while
it is true that the California statutes do in several cases impose a duty on
doctors to report information to state agencies, there appears to have been no
previously existing statute which imposes on health care providers the
requirements of Proposition 187.161 Second, the patients' claims to privacy
156. Id. at 600.
157. Id. at 602.
158. Id. at 602 n.29.
159. Id. at 602.
160. Id. at 604.
161. California statutes require physicians or health care providers to report to state agencies where,
for instance, child abuse is suspected (CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160 (1996)) or where certain contagious
diseases are found (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120250 (West 1995)). Proposition 187's reporting
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which were rejected in Whalen may survive such scrutiny given a challenge
to Proposition 187's reporting provisions. There is no pressing public or
private health concern which is served by the provisions. While this is not a
clearly stated prerequisite to the finding that a disclosure in such a setting
does not invade privacy rights, this is surely implicit in the Court's detailed
listing of such permissible disclosures.
Two other issues raised in Whalen which also arise for both health care
providers and patients when disclosure is mandated are claims to freedom of
association and individual anonymity. The Court in Whalen discussed these
issues in a footnote to its opinion, stating that its decisions in the area of
freedom of association protect that freedom "for the purpose of advancing
ideas and airing grievances," not anonymity in the course of medical
treatment. 162 The Court also noted that another factor in finding such an
associational issue, even where medical records are concerned, would be an
"uncontroverted showing of past harm."' 16 3 This factor, according to the
Court in Whalen, was absent in the claims of the physicians and patients.
Conceivably, potential health care provider claimants might fare better in
such a challenge to Proposition 187's reporting requirements, as several
persons involved in dispensing health care had already set forth such
assertions in affidavits filed with early challenging actions.' 64
VI. EXCLUSION OF UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS FROM PUBLIC ELEMENTARY
AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS
Unlike the provisions concerning health care and social services, the
provisions on education do not start with a statement of purpose, but rather,
cut to the chase by directly detailing the provisions. Could it be that the
drafters could think of no supportable purpose for such an amendment? Also,
unlike the provisions involving law enforcement, and social and medical
services, school attendance is not limited to only those aliens who are either
lawful permanent or temporary residents, but is available to any person
"otherwise authorized under federal law to be in the United States." This
phrase is the closest that any portion of Proposition 187 comes to admitting
the existence of and potential rights of PRUCOL aliens, though Holley v.
Lavine explicitly states that the phrase "under color of law" includes actions
not "covered by specific authorizations of law." 165 This seemingly gracious
concession appears to permit school attendance to a broader group of aliens
provisions for health care facilities are new in both sum and substance, and thus cannot be said to be
merely reiterations of duties already imposed on health care providers.
162. 429 U.S. at 604 n.32 (citing Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960)).
163. Id. (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,454 (1958)).
164. Supplemental Exhibits and Declarations in Support of Application for Temporary Restraining
Order, Gregorio T. v. Wilson (Case No. 94-7652). In this filing, the plaintiffs included several affidavits
from physicians, administrators, social workers, and patients regarding medical care which many patients
had foregone in fear of the consequences of Proposition 187.
165. 553 F.2d at 849.
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than would be permitted service under other sections of Proposition 187.
However, it is probably little more than a red herring designed to distract
from the principal point of objection to this section: under Plyler v. Doe, 66
even undocumented alien children are entitled to attend school.
Given the holding of Plyler v. Doe, the requirement that school districts
verify the legal status of each child enrolling in school appears to be
impermissible. The provisions require, in addition, not only that children's
immigration status be verified, but also that their parents' status be verified.
Even assuming that it is permissible to use alien status as a basis for
removing children from school, it is not clear why their parents' status is
relevant. Adults unlawfully present in the United States may have children
who are lawfully present or are citizens of the country.' 67
Providing information to others regarding a school child, and any aspect of
his school record, violates long-standing provisions regarding privacy of
school records. 168 Moreover, sending information to parents regarding their
children's or their own apparently illegal status, and purporting to cut off the
right to school attendance, seems to be impermissible without some sort of
procedural due process. 1
69
Similarly, where rights to school attendance are implicated, there is an
existing property interest in educational benefits, as well as a liberty interest.
In Goss v. Lopez, 7 ' several Columbus, Ohio public school students alleged
that they had been suspended from public high school for up to ten days
without a hearing pursuant to state regulations, and that their suspensions
violated the procedural due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The suspensions were based upon various charges of misconduct
against the students. Judgment was granted for the students both at the trial
court level and before a three-judge appellate panel, whereupon the school
administrators appealed.
The school administrators argued first that because there is no constitu-
tional right to an education at public expense, the Due Process Clause does
not protect against expulsions from the. public school system. The Court
rejected this contention out of hand, stating that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects against the deprivation of life, liberty and property without due
process of law, and that those protected interests are not generally created by
the Constitution, but rather are defined independently.' 7' The Court went on
to say that even if the State of Ohio had not been constitutionally required to
166. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). However, note that the recently debated Gallegly Amendment H.R. 4134 to
the pending Immigration Bill would deny free public education to the children of undocumented aliens.
167. The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that persons born in the United
States are citizens of the United States. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. In most instances, this is true regardless
of the citizenship of their parents.
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create and maintain a public school system, the state had in fact done so, and
required its children to attend.' 7 2
Regarding Proposition 187, the State of California would similarly fail in
making an argument that there is no constitutional right to an education,
since, as in Ohio, California has created and maintained public schools, and
mandated attendance. 73 Moreover, the Constitution of the State of Califor-
nia provides that education is a fundamental right. 1
74
Liberty interests are somewhat harder to delineate than are property
interests for purposes of due process analysis. Liberty interests are at stake
when, for instance, physical liberty is restrained.' 7 5 Liberty also encom-
passes all of the constitutional provisions which have been made applicable
to the states by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment.' 7 6 In
discussing the liberty interests of the school children involved in Goss v.
Lopez, the Court referred to a liberty interest in a person's good name, which
may not be subject to arbitrary deprivation.' 77 Because the students in Goss v.
Lopez were alleged to have misbehaved, such charges, if sustained and
recorded, could have caused damage to the students' future opportunities. 
178
Here, a comparison with the effects of Proposition 187's suspension raises
some interesting issues.
Students, or their parents, if determined to be in the country without
federal authority, are potentially part of a class of persons who have
committed a crime, and thus could arguably be entitled to fewer due process
protections. In Plyler v. Doe, the Court declined to find that undocumented
aliens are a suspect class such as would allow the application of strict
scrutiny in the analysis of laws which seem to discriminate against them.'
79
In so deciding, Justice Brennan noted that membership in the class of illegal
aliens is itself a crime.' 8 ° However, this is not necessarily the case, as was
seen in Gonzales v. City of Peoria,'8' where unauthorized presence in the
country did not lead to the conclusion that one violated criminal provisions
of the immigration laws. Proposition 187 mandates delivery of a suspension
notice upon either a determination or a reasonable suspicion that a student (or
his parents) are in the country without authorization. No procedures are set
172. Id. at 574.
173. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West 1995).
174. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5.
175- See, e.g., Meachum, 427 U.S. 215; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
176. The First, Fourth, and Sixth Amendments of the Bill of Rights are applicable to the states, as are
most of the provisions of the Fifth and Eighth amendments. The Fifth Amendment's right to grand jury
indictment has not yet been incorporated, nor has the Eighth Amendment's guarantee of freedom from
excessive bail. The Second, Third, and Seventh Amendments have not been incorporated to any degree
See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937);
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
177. 419 U.S. at 574.
178. Id. at 574-75.
179. 457 U.S. at 219, n.19.
180. Id.
181. 722 F.2d 468,476 (9th Cir. 1983). See supra notes 102 to 108 for a discussion of Gonzales.
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forth for reaching such a determination, or for developing such a suspicion;
the provisions do not call for an initial finding of unlawful presence by an
immigration court. If there were such a finding made of unlawful or
particularly of criminal presence, then there might conceivably be a basis for
reduced due process rights. 1
82
VII. EXCLUSION OF UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS FROM PUBLIC
POST-SECONDARY SCHOOLS
State regulations which potentially discriminate against alien college
students have been addressed by the Supreme Court. In Toll v. Moreno,t83
alien students at the University of Maryland brought suit to challenge a state
policy which denied non-immigrant alien students the right to be treated as
state residents for purposes of reduced tuition and fees, regardless of whether
they had otherwise met standards for state residency. The policy was
challenged under several federal laws, as well as under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court found
that the state's policy effectively conflicted with federal laws concerning the
particular group of aliens in question, and invalidated the policy under the
Supremacy Clause. The Court found no need to reach the due process and
equal protection claims.' 84 A significant factor in the case of the students in
Toll v. Moreno and those affected by Proposition 187 is that the students in
Toll held a lawful immigration status, that of G-4 nonimmigrants. Were those
same students to seek admission to a public post-secondary school in
California after the implementation of Proposition 187, they would appar-
ently encounter no difficulties, as the provisions on post-secondary school
expressly include the phrase "authorized under federal law" to be present. '85
Because the provisions on post-secondary school are inoculated from
Supremacy Clause attack, potential challengers of Proposition 187 must
necessarily turn to due process and equal protection claims. Such claimants
may have the benefit of heightened scrutiny designation for purposes of
review of state actions.' 8 6 Conceivably, a state scheme which discriminates
against aliens in enrollment raises concerns about the creation of a permanent
underclass, such as those addressed in Plyler v. Doe. ' 8 7 While the Court in
Plyler was particularly concerned with the burdens placed on alien children
by the inability to attend school without cost, such concerns might clearly be
an issue in a society where higher education is one of the few egresses from a
life of poverty.1
88
182. Meachum, 427 U-S. 215 (discussing instances in which a person who has been convicted of a
crime might be subject to a loss of liberty rights).
183. 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
184. Id. at 10.
185. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66010.8(a) (West 1995).
186. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
187. Id.
188. According to an article by Steven A. Holmes, while the gap in secondary education between
Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites is closing, there is still a wide disparity between Whites and Blacks because
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VIII. ATTORNEY GENERAL COOPERATION WITH THE INS
Also troublesome to liberty interests in this procedural due process
analysis of Proposition 187 are the provisions regarding law enforcement.
Law enforcement agencies would be required to "fully cooperate" with the
INS.189 Such cooperation in and of itself is not offensive to procedural due
process.' 90 However, the "verification" process by which law enforcement
officers determine whether or not a person is or may be a person in the
country without authorization is ripe for abuses and violations of the due
process rights of arrestees. If a person is detained or arrested because of an
alleged violation of an immigration law, that detention or arrest must meet
federal constitutional standards.' 9'
IX. AMENDMENT AND SEVERABILITY
Proposition 187 contains a clause which provides for severability if any
portion of the Act becomes invalid or if it is found invalid with reference to
any person. Such invalidity "shall not affect any other provision or applica-
tion of the act, which can be given effect without the invalid provision or
application." 19 2 This provision anticipates the possibility that a court could
find a provision or provisions of the proposition unconstitutional either on its
face, or as applied. Normally, if a court finds that a statute is unconstitutional
under any set of circumstances, then the entire statute must be stricken.
Under this provision, however, if a court finds a provision to be invalid, then
the invalid provision may be severed from the remainder of the statute. Under
Proposition 187, severability is possible if the invalid portion can be removed
without undermining the legal affect of the statute, and if the legislature
intended the provision to stand even if other provisions were deemed
impermissible1
93
X. THE OPINION OF THE DISTRICT COURT
After consolidation of several actions challenging the constitutionality of
Proposition 187 in U.S. District Court, and after the entry of a preliminary
injunction enjoining the implementation of sections four, five, six, seven, and
nine of the initiative, two of the plaintiffs brought motions for summary
judgment. '94
a higher proportion of Whites graduate from college. Education Gap Between Races Closes, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 1996, A18.
189. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834b (a) (West 1995).
190. See, e.g., the SHARE provisions concerning the INS and local governments.
191. Gonzales, 722 E2d at 477.
192. See Appendix.
193. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924).
194. The five cases which were filed in opposition to the Proposition are:
(1) League of United Latin American Citizens ("LULAC") v. Wilson, Case No. CV 94-7569 MRP;
19961
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The district court ruled on the summary judgment on November 20,
1995.'95 In its ruling, the court first considered the severability of the
provisions to determine if any portion of the initiative could stand, should
any portion be stricken. After ruling that the entire initiative need not fall due
to the weight of invalid portions, the court considered whether Proposition
187 is preempted by federal law, either under the De Canas v. Bica test,' 96 or
because of Congressional intent to occupy the field. The court declined for
the most part to go beyond preemption analysis.
A. Severability
The Court relied upon Calfarm Insurance v. Deukmejian'97 as authority in
determining that an impermissible provision may be severable from the
remainder of the initiative. In determining that the whole initiative need not
fall due to an invalid provision, the court found the severability clause of
section 10 of the Proposition instrumental in its analysis. Thus, the individual
provisions must be reviewed separately when determining whether each may
stand absent any impermissible clauses or language which might be stricken.
The court pointed to the three-pronged test of Calfarm which reviewing
courts must use in evaluating the severability of invalid statutory provisions.
Such provisions "must be grammatically, functionally, and volitionally
separable."' 98
Grammatical severability is a function of whether the provision can be
"removed as a whole without affecting the wording of any other provi-
sion."' 99 Functional severability describes the ability of a provision to stand
on .its own and to be capable of "separate enforcement." 2" Volitional
severability describes whether or not the severance of a provision would
continue to reflect the will of the people enacting the statute. As described by
the court in citing to Calfarm, the overall question in reviewing severability
of a challenged provision is whether remaining provisions "would likely
have been adopted by the people had they foreseen the invalidity" of the
challenged provision.
(2) Children Who Want an Education v. Wilson, Case No. CV 94-7570 MRP;
(3) Ayala v. Wilson, Case No. CV 94-7571 MRP;
(4) Gregorio T. v. Wilson, Case No. CV 94-7652 MRP;
(5) Carlos P. v. Wilson, Case No. CV 95-0187 MRP.
On May 1, 1995, LULAC and the Gregorio T. plaintiffs filed summary judgment motions which argued
that the Proposition was unconstitutional based upon federal preemption by the Immigration and
Naturalization Act and other federal statutes. These plaintiffs were joined by other interested parties as
well.
195. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
196. See supra note 84, and accompanying text.
197. 48 Cal. 3d 805 (1989).
198. League of United Latin American Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 766 (citing Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at
821).
199. Id. (citing Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 822).
200. Id. (citing People's Advocate Inc. v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 316, 331-32 (1986)).
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B. Preemption
The court evaluated whether Proposition 187 is preempted by federal law
by applying the three part test of De Canas v. Bica.20 ' Applying part one, the
court analyzed whether the initiative is an impermissible regulation of
immigration. The result of that analysis was that Proposition 187, while a
regulation of immigration, is not in its entirety necessarily imperiissible.
The benefits provisions, the court held, are permissible, as they do not require
independent state determinations regarding the immigration status of individu-
als.20 2 The notification, classification, and cooperation/reporting provisions
of the initiative, however, are aimed solely at immigration, and are therefore
impermissible.2 °3 These are provisions contained in specific portions of
sections 4 through 9 of the initiative, and in the preamble.
Having indicated the general impermissibility of some of the sections, the
court then applied De Canas to sections 4 through 9 of the initiative in order
to lay out the precise redaction required under the doctrine of severability.
The court applied each prong of De Canas to the provisions indicated. Most
failed at the first prong.
In commencing with section 4, the section mandating law enforcement
cooperation with the INS, the court addressed sections 4 (a), (b)(1), (b)(2),
(b)(3) and (c). Section 4(a) requires law enforcement agencies to fully
cooperate with the INS regarding persons arrested who are suspected of
being in the United States illegally. 204 Section 4(b)(1) requires the arresting
agency to attempt to verify the immigration status of the arrestee suspected of
being present in the country in violation of federal immigration law. This
section permits as one method of verification the questioning of such
individuals regarding name, date and place of birth and date of entry into the
United States.2 °5 Sections 4(b)(2) and (b)(3) require that arrested persons be
notified of their "apparent" status as aliens whose presence violates immigra-
tion law, and requires that the agency notify the Attorney General of
California and INS regarding such status.20 6 Section 4(c) prohibits local
government entities from inhibiting law enforcement cooperation. 2 07 All of
these sections violate the first prong of the De Canas test in that they
impermissibly regulate immigration by requiring agents of the state to make
determinations as to who is and is not in the country in violation of
immigration laws, by mandating that such findings be reported to state and
federal authorities, and by requiring cooperation with the INS in order to
ensure the departure of any such persons.208
201. See supra text accompanying note 84.
202. League of United Latin American Citizens, 908 E Supp. at 770.
203. Id. at 769-70.
204. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834b (a) (West 1995).
205. Id. § 4 (b)(1).
206. Id- §§ 4 (b)(2) & (b)(3).
207. Id. § 4(c).
208. League of United Latin American Citizens, 908 F Supp. at 770.
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The court then moved on to sections 5 and 6 of the initiative, noting that
unlike section 4, these sections have a purpose beyond effecting the ouster of
persons suspected of being unlawfully in the country. The benefits denial
provisions of these sections are based on federal determinations regarding
status and thus are not regulations of immigration as would be prohibited by
De Canas. However, the court went on to state, sections 5(b), (c)(2) and 6(b),
and (c)(2) contain classification, notification and reporting provisions which
are objectionable in that they, like similar provisions of section 4, impermis-
sibly require state agents to make independent determinations regarding the
immigration status of individuals, and to report such findings to state and
federal authorities. 9 Moreover, subsection (b) of sections 5 and 6 impermis-
sibly creates a scheme for determining who is and is not entitled to be in the
United States. This subsection refers only to persons who are citizens,
lawfully admitted for permanent residence or lawfully admitted for a tempo-
rary period, effectively ignoring numerous classes of people who under a
federal standard would be entitled to presence in the country.2 to The
defendants in the matter unsuccessfully argued that the phrase "lawfully
admitted" should be construed as "lawfully present" in order to bring the
subsections in line with federal standards and thus salvage the subsections.
The court rejected this contention, however, noting that the term "lawfully
admitted" has its own particular meaning under the Immigration and Natural-
ization Act.2 1 ' Even were the term to be replaced, the statute would not meet
federal standards on this point.
212
Thus, subsections 5 and 6(b), (c)(1) and (c)(2) were deemed impermissible
and were preempted. Subsection (c)(1) of section 5 was allowed to stand.
This subsection requires that state agents deny benefits to persons who are
determined to be or suspected of being in the United States in violation of
federal law. Because of its link to federal standards, the provision may
remain. However, the portion of the subsection which permits state agents to
make a determination as to such individuals, or to act regarding those even
"reasonably suspected" of presence in violation of federal law, is objection-
able on the grounds that it permits state agents to make a determination that
only the INS can make. Rather than striking this provision, the court
reformed it by severing the reasonable suspicion language, and by suggesting
a state regulation which would require any actual determination regarding
immigration status to be provided by the INS.2 13
Section 7 of the statute concerns the exclusion of "illegal aliens" from
public elementary and secondary schools. The court duly noted that this
section, like sections 5 and 6, contains classification, notification and coopera-
209. Id. at 772.
210. See supra notes 128 to 131 for discussion of PRUCOL.
211. League of United Latin American Citizens, 908 F Supp. at 772.
212. Id. at 771.
213. id. at 773.
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tion requirements which further the scheme to regulate immigration and are
unnecessary to the goal of denying public education. Subsections (a), (b), and
(c) of section 7 require the schools to verify students' immigration status in
order to deny them access. Subsection (d) requires that schools verify the
status of parents of such children. Subsection (e) requires that districts report
to the state or the INS the "illegal" status of any parent, guardian, enrollee, or
pupil. Section (f) mandates that the school districts cooperate fully in the
transition of the child to a school in the child's country of origin. 1 4
The court allowed that subsections (a), (b) and (c) achieve the goal of
denying undocumented children access to school.215 Assuming, arguendo,
that this is a permissible goal, an additional obstacle is encountered in that
subsections (d), (e) and (f) are not necessary to the purpose of denying a
public education to students determined to be in the country "illegally," but
rather are part of an impermissible scheme to regulate immigration and thus
are preempted.2 16
The court noted, however, the seeming inutility of reaching an analysis of
section 7 under De Canas given the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Plyler
v. Doe. 17 The district court reviewing Proposition 187 found that Plyler's
holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits states from excluding undocumented alien children from public
education is in conflict with section 7, and thus section 7 in its entirety is
preempted by federal law.2 18
Section 8 of the statute denies public post-secondary education to persons
not "authorized under federal law" to be in the United States, and requires
institutions to verify the immigration status of each person enrolled or
attending. This section further requires admissions officers to report any
persons determined to be or reasonably suspected of being in the United
States in violation of federal immigration law. The court found that subsec-
tions 8(a) and (b) are akin to the denial of benefits provisions of sections 5
and 6 in that they do not require determinations as to who may and may not
remain in the country, and thus are permissible.2 19 Subsection (c) however,
has as its only purpose the regulation of immigration, and thus must be
stricken. The court found further that it may be severed, as the other
subsections may be implemented without it.
22 °
Section 9 of the statute calls for the California Attorney General to
cooperate with the INS by maintaining records of all reports received from
state agencies regarding persons suspected of being in the country in
violation of federal immigration law, and to transport this information to the
214. Id. at 774.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
218. League of United Latin American Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 773-74.
219. Id. at 774.
220. Id.
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INS. This section, the court stated, has no other purpose than to impermissi-
bly regulate immigration. The court found that it severable from the whole.22'
Part two of the De Canas test concerns whether Proposition 187 is
preempted because Congress intended to occupy the field. Having deter-
mined that some portions of sections 4 through 9 were impermissible under
part one of the De Canas test, the court considered only the remaining
provisions under part two of the De Canas test; sections 2 and 3 concerning
criminal provisions, and some portions of sections 5 through 8. The court
permitted these remaining provisions to stand, finding nothing in the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Act which acts as a complete ouster of state
authority to criminalize the production of documents, or to prevent the
benefits denial called for under sections 5 through 8.222
Finally, the court applied part three of the De Canas test, whether the
Proposition is preempted because it directly conflicts with federal law. First,
the court considered the classification, notification and reporting provisions
which it had already submitted to analysis under the first two prongs of De
Canas. These provisions, the court found, violate the third prong as well as
the first two, in that they conflict with federal laws concerning the deportation
of aliens.223 The court pointed to the list of grounds for deportation found in
the Immigration and Naturalization Act and noted with particularity the
requirement that the procedures outlined therein are to be the sole procedures
for determining the deportability of aliens.
224
The court then looked at the denial of benefits provisions under the third
prong, and found that these provisions depend upon the classification and
verification provisions of the statute for implementation. These provisions of
the statute establish three "state-created categories of lawful immigration
status:" citizens of the United States, aliens lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, and aliens lawfully admitted for a temporary period of time.
225
The court found that these provisions fail to recognize numerous other
persons who, though not falling into one of the three categories, are
nonetheless authorized to be present in the United States and to receive
certain federal benefits. The court cited by way of example those accorded
refugee status, those granted political asylum or its corollary withholding of
deportation, persons paroled into the United States or protected by family
unity provisions, persons given temporary protected status or the often
related deferred enforced departure status, those eligible for suspension of or
stay of deportation, and battered immigrant women and children lawfully
present in the country for various periods.22 6
221. Id. at 775.
222. Id. at 776.
223. Id. at 776-77.
224. Id. at 777 (citing 8 U.S.C § 125 1(a) (1992)).
225. Id. at 777-78.
226. Id. at 778. Many of the persons enumerated are those often considered as PRUCOL aliens.
PRUCOL is not a separate immigration status, and can be applied to persons who meet no specific
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Because of this underinclusiveness of the categories, the court found that
the classification scheme used to deny aliens social services, health benefits
and education to be preempted under the third De Canas test. The court
further found that much like the other sections found impermissible under De
Canas, the offending subsections may be severed from the remainder of the
227initiative.
The remaining verification provisions of subsection 5(c), 6(c), 7(b) and
8(b) fared no better under the third prong of De Canas. Although the court
stated that these provisions are permissible to the extent that they rely upon
federal standards for determining immigration status, these provisions are
nevertheless preempted under the third prong of De Canas. The "reasonably
suspects" language which permits implementation of the process of verifica-
tion, though preempted, may be severed.22 8
In analyzing the benefits denial provisions the court went beyond a
determination of whether denials are made based on federal standards and
examines whether the preemption argument goes only to federally funded
benefits. The court cited Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,229 in its discussions of
whether any state-funded benefits may be denied. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. is, the district court opined, unclear in this area. Moreover, there is no
clear showing by the proponents of Proposition 187 that there are any wholly
state-funded benefits in California to which the initiative could apply.
230
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. involved a Washington state law which
regulated the size, design, and movement of oil tankers in Puget Sound.
Atlantic Richfield and others challenged the law, contending among other
things that the law was preempted by federal law in the field.2 3' After a
three-judge district court panel held the statute void in its entirety, the state
appealed. 232 The Supreme Court held that some of the provisions of the
Tanker Law were invalid under the Supremacy Clause in that they touched
statutory definition such as those enumerated by the court. The fact that a person can at anytime be defined
as PRUCOL without reference to any other particular statutory grant of immigration status means that
even had the initiative attempted to include those persons lawfully permitted to be present in the country,
such as the enumeration of the court, there would still he the risk of excluding someone who could be
termed PRUCOL under interpretations of case law.
227. Id. at 778-79.
228. Id. at 779.
229. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
230. League of United Latin American Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 780.
231. There was also a claim that the law violated the Commerce Clause in that it is in the nature of a
regulation requiring a uniform national rule, and that it impeded the free flow of interstate and foreign
commerce. However, this claim was not sustained by the Court in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S.
151, 152 (1978). Though such a claim was not brought in the initial challenge to Proposition 187, it is
interesting to speculate as to the likelihood of the success of a direct Commerce Clause claim, or of such a
claim as might be implicated under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which is based to a great extent on the
Commerce Clause. Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act forbids state or local denial of federal program
benefits when those benefits are administered by the state or local entity, and provides for the cessation of
federal aid to local or state entities found to engage in discrimination who continue such activity after an
order is issued to cease discrimination. Such entities may not discriminate on the basis of race, color, or
national origin.
232. Jurisdiction in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. was under 28 U.S.C § 2281, 2284.
GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
upon areas where there was either existing conflicting federal regulation, or
into areas where the federal government had made clear that it intended there
to be no standards other than federal standards. The section in Atlantic
Richfield Co., which the district court apparently finds unclear, is the
determination of whether a federal law touches a field "in which the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject."-233 Because Atlantic Rich-
field Co. dealt with the subject of tanker regulation and the very specialized
provisions of state law versus federal laws on the subject, perhaps the lack of
clarity was that the Proposition 187 court could find no applicable standards
which helped in its own analysis in the area of state created benefits.
Declining to fully analyze the issue of whether any state provided benefits
could be denied under the initiative, the court moved on to a discussion of its
finding that several laws regarding federal benefits would conflict with the
application of the benefits denial provisions.2 34 Among these are the Women,
Infants and Children program,2 35 and other child welfare services that are
available to children regardless of immigration status. The court also found
objectionable provisions of the initiative that would deny health care services
to persons without lawful immigration status, and cited again several federal
provisions which would conflict with the initiative. 36
XI. CONCLUSION
In analyzing Proposition 187, the court has, as might be expected, reached
only the threshold supremacy issue in analyzing the provisions, eschewing
other underlying constitutional grounds of challenge. The fairly elaborate
analysis and attack which is now possible under a preemption analysis is the
result of numerous federal provisions which are in conflict with Proposition
187. If some of our federal legislators are successful, many of the federal
provisions providing services to various aliens will be severely restricted.237
It is very likely, that the sort of analysis seen in this Article would be
required. 38 Moreover, as was seen in the analyses of the various provisions,
many of the sections which the district court deemed permissible under a
preemption analysis are conceivably objectionable under other constitutional
standards.
233. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. at 157-58 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz 312 U.S. 52 (1941)).
234. League of United Latin American Citizens, 908 F. Supp. at 781-84.
235. 42 U.S.C. § 1786 (1992).
236. The court cited the Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. § 291 et seq., the Public Health Services Act, 42
U.S.C. § 254(c), and the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395(dd). See
also, Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
237. See e.g., H.R. 4134 which proposes among other things denying free public education to
undocumented children and preventing undocumented parents from collecting benefits on behalf of their
children.
238 At least one recent commentator has noted that because of proposed changes to federal
legislation, a preemption argument may "win a battle, not the war." Evangeline G. Abriel, Rethinking
Preemption for Purposes ofAliens and Public Benefits, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1597 (1995).
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Arguably, Proposition 187 and its state and federal progeny may serve to
take us full circle, to the period in our history when states routinely legislated
in the area of immigration. This is particularly true as we see states
increasingly engage in acts which suggest a sovereignty of their own.
APPENDIX
California Proposition 187 (1994) provides:
PROPOSITION 187
INITIATIVE STATUTE-ILLEGAL ALIENS-PUBLIC SERVICES,
VERIFICATION, AND REPORTING
PROPOSED LAW
The People of California find and declare as follows:
SECTION 1. Findings and Declaration.
That they have suffered and are suffering economic hardship caused by the
presence of illegal aliens in this state.
That they have suffered and are suffering personal injury and damage
caused by the criminal conduct of illegal aliens in this state.
That they have a right to the protection of their government from any
person or persons entering this country unlawfully.
Therefore, the People of California declare their intention to provide for
cooperation between their agencies of state and local government with the
federal government, and to establish a system of required notification by and
between such agencies to prevent illegal aliens in the United States from
receiving benefits or public services in the State of California.
SECTION 2. Manufacture, Distribution or Sale of False Citizenship or
Resident Alien Documents: Crime and Punishment.
Section 113 is added to the Penal Code, to read:
<<CA PENAL § 113>>
113. Any person who manufactures, distributes or sells false documents to
conceal the true citizenship or resident alien status of another person is guilty
of a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for five
years or by a fine of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000).
SECTION 3. Use of False Citizenship or Resident Alien Documents:
Crime and Punishment.
Section 114 is added to the Penal Code, to read:
<<CA PENAL § 114>>
1996]
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114. Any person who uses false documents to conceal his or her true
citizenship or resident alien status is guilty of a felony, and shall be punished
by imprisonment in the state prison for five years or by a fine of twenty-five
thousand dollars ($25,000).
SECTION 4. Law Enforcement Cooperation with INS.
Section 834b is added to the Penal Code, to read:
<<CA PENAL § 834b>>
834b. (a) Every law enforcement agency in California shall fully coop-
erate with the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service regard-
ing any person who is arrested if he or she is suspected of being present in the
United States in violation of federal immigration laws.
(b) With respect to any such person who is arrested, and suspected of
being present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws,
every law enforcement agency shall do the following:
(1) Attempt to verify the legal status of such person as a citizen of the
United States, an alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident, an alien
lawfully admitted for a temporary period of time or as an alien who is present
in the United States in violation of immigration laws. The verification
process may include, but shall not be limited to, questioning the person
regarding his or her date and place of birth, and entry into the United States,
and demanding documentation to indicate his or her legal status.
(2) Notify the person of his or her apparent status as an alien who is
present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws and
inform him or her that, apart from any criminal justice proceedings, he or she
must either obtain legal status or leave the United States.
(3) Notify the Attorney General of California and the United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service of the apparent illegal status and
provide any additional information that may be requested by any other public
entity.
(c) Any legislative, administrative, or other action by a city, county, or
other legally authorized local governmental entity with jurisdictional bound-
aries, or by a law enforcement agency, to prevent or limit the cooperation
required by subdivision (a) is expressly prohibited.
SECTION 5. Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Public Social Services.
Section 10001.5 is added to the Welfare and Institutions Code, to read:
<<CA WEL & INST § 10001.5>>
10001.5. (a) In order to carry out the intention of the People of Califor-
nia that only citizens of the United States and aliens lawfully admitted to the
United States may receive the benefits of public social services and to ensure
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that all persons employed in the providing of those services shall diligently
protect public funds from misuse, the provisions of this section are adopted.
(b) A person shall not receive any public social services to which he or she
may be otherwise entitled until the legal status of that person has been
verified as one of the following:
(1) A citizen of the United States.
(2) An alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident.
(3) An alien lawfully admitted for a temporary period of time.
(c) If any public entity in this state to whom a person has applied for
public social services determines or reasonably suspects, based upon the
information provided to it, that the person is an alien in the United States in
violation of federal law, the following procedures shall be followed by the
public entity:
(1) The entity shall not provide the person with benefits or services.
(2) The entity shall, in writing, notify the person of his or her apparent
illegal immigration status, and that the person must either obtain legal status
or leave the United States.
(3) The entity shall also notify the State Director of Social Services, the
Attorney General of California, and the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service of the apparent illegal status, and shall provide any
additional information that may be requested by any other public entity.
<<CA WEL & INST Prec. § 130>>
SECTION 6. Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Publicly Funded Health
Care.
Chapter 1.3 (commencing with Section 130) is added to Part I of Division
1 of the Health and Safety Code, to read:
CHAPTER 1.3. PUBLICLY-FUNDED HEALTH CARE SERVICES
<<CA HLTH & SFTY § 130>>
130. (a) In order to carry out the intention of the People of California
that, excepting emergency medical care as required by federal law, only
citizens of the United States and aliens lawfully admitted to the United States
may receive the benefits of publicly-funded health care, and to ensure that all
persons employed in the providing of those services shall diligently protect
public funds from misuse, the provisions of this section are adopted.
(b) A person shall not receive any health care services from a publicly-
funded health care facility, to which he or she is otherwise entitled until the
legal status of that person has been verified as one of the following:
(1) A citizen of the United States.
(2) An alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident.
(3) An alien lawfully admitted for a temporary period of time.
(c) If any publicly-funded health care facility in this state from whom a
person seeks health care services, other than emergency medical care as
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required by federal law, determines or reasonably suspects, based upon the
information provided to it, that the person is an alien in the United States in
violation of federal law, the following procedures shall be followed by the
facility:
(1) The facility shall not provide the person with services.
(2) The facility shall, in writing, notify the person of his or her apparent
illegal immigration status, and that the person must either obtain legal status
or leave the United States.
(3) The facility shall also notify the State Director of Health Services,
the Attorney' General of California, and the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service of the apparent illegal status, and shall provide any
additional information that may be requested by any other public entity.
(d) For purposes of this section "publicly-funded health care facility"
shall be defined as specified in Sections 1200 and 1250 of this code as of
January 1, 1993.
SECTION 7. Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Public Elementary and
Secondary Schools.
Section 48215 is added to the Education Code, to read:
<<CA EDUC § 48215>>
48215. (a) No public elementary or secondary school shall admit, or
permit the attendance of, any child who is not a citizen of the United States,
an alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident, or a person who is
otherwise authorized under federal law to be present in the United States.
(b) Commencing January 1, 1995, each school district shall verify the
legal status of each child enrolling in the school district for the first time in
order to ensure the enrollment or attendance only of citizens, aliens lawfully
admitted as permanent residents, or persons who are otherwise authorized to
be present in the United States.
(c) By January 1, 1996, each school district shall have verified the legal
status of each child already enrolled and in attendance in the school district in
order to ensure the enrollment or attendance only of citizens, aliens lawfully
admitted as permanent residents, or persons who are otherwise authorized
under federal law to be present in the United States.
(d) By January 1, 1996, each school district shall also have verified the
legal status of each parent or guardian of each child referred to in subdivi-
sions (b) and (c), to determine whether such parent or guardian is one of the
following:
(1) A citizen of the United States.
(2) An alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident.
(3) An alien admitted lawfully for a temporary period of time.
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(e) Each school district shall provide information to the State Superinten-
dent of Public Instruction, the Attorney General of California, and the United
States Immigration and Naturalization Service regarding any enrollee or
pupil, or parent or guardian, attending a public elementary or secondary
school in the school district determined or reasonably suspected to be in
violation of federal immigration laws within forty-five days after becoming
aware of an apparent violation. The notice shall also be provided to the parent
or legal guardian of the enrollee or pupil, and shall state that an existing pupil
may not continue to attend the school after ninety calendar days from the date
of the notice, unless legal status is established.
(f) For each child who cannot establish legal status in the United States,
each school district shall continue to provide education for a period of ninety
days from the date of the notice. Such ninety day period shall be utilized to
accomplish an orderly transition to a school in the child's country of origin.
Each school district shall fully cooperate in this transition effort to ensure that
the educational needs of the child are best served for that period of time.
SECTION 8. Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Public Postsecondary
Educational Institutions.
Section 66010.8 is added to the Education Code, to read:
<<CA EDUC § 66010.8>>
66010.8. (a) No public institution of postsecondary education shall
admit, enroll, or permit the attendance of any person who is not a citizen of
the United States, an alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident in the
United States, or a person who is otherwise authorized under federal law to
be present in the United States.
(b) Commencing with the first term or semester that begins after January
1, 1995, and at the commencement of each term or semester thereafter, each
public postsecondary educational institution shall verify the status of each
person enrolled or in attendance at that institution in order to ensure the
enrollment or attendance only of United States citizens, aliens lawfully
admitted as permanent residents in the United States, and persons who are
otherwise authorized under federal law to be present in the United States.
(c) No later than 45 days after the admissions officer of a public postsec-
ondary educational institution becomes aware of the application, enrollment,
or attendance of a person determined to be, or who is under reasonable
suspicion of being, in the United States in violation of federal immigration
laws, that officer shall provide that information to the State Superintendent of
Public Instruction, the Attorney General of California, and the United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service. The information shall also be
provided to the applicant, enrollee, or person admitted.
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SECTION 9. Attorney General Cooperation with the INS.
Section 53069.65 is added to the Government Code, to read:
<<CA GOVT § 53069.65>>
53069.65. Whenever the state or a city, or a county, or any other legally
authorized local governmental entity with jurisdictional boundaries reports
the presence of a person who is suspected of being present in the United
States in violation of federal immigration laws to the Attorney General of
California, that report shall be transmitted to the United States Immigration
and Naturalization Service. The Attorney General shall be responsible for
maintaining on-going and accurate records of such reports, and shall provide
any additional information that may be requested by any'other government
entity.
SECTION 10. Amendment and Severability.
The statutory provisions contained in this measure may not be amended by
the Legislature except to further its purposes by statute passed in each house
by roll call vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership
concurring, or by a statute that becomes effective only when approved by the
voters. In the event that any portion of this act or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect any
other provision or application of the act, which can be given effect without
the invalid provision or application, and to that end the provisions of this act
are severable. CA Prop. 187 (1994)
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